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Article

Subverting Title IX
Emily Suski†
INTRODUCTION
By the time elementary school teacher Gary Stroup put his “hand
down [fourth grade student John Doe’s] pants and fondled hi[m],”
school administrators had been receiving reports for six years of
Stroup’s inappropriate behavior with children. 1 That behavior included kicking students’ buttocks, pinching their “chests and posteriors,” touching a student’s thigh, and, as one young student wrote in a
letter to the principal, touching his pubic, or as the boy wrote, “public”
area. 2 After learning of several instances of improper touching, the
school merely admonished Stroup in two letters and in person not to
touch students in those ways. 3 Then, shortly after the principal received the student’s letter stating that Stroup touched the student’s
“public areas,” the principal departed her job without informing her
successor of the student’s letter or any of the concerns regarding
Stroup.4 Given the fecklessness of the school’s responses to reports of
Stroup’s behavior, Stroup’s subsequent abuse of John Doe hardly
seems surprising.5 Yet, when John Doe brought a Title IX claim against
the school for failing to adequately address Stroup’s behavior and
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to Adrian Alvarez, Derek Black, Nancy Chi Cantalupo, Anne Eisenberg, Josh Gupta-Kagan, Kate Kruse, Rob Marsico, Lisa Martin, Ben Means, Claire Raj, Arti Sidhu, and Joseph
Seiner for their thoughtful comments on this Article. I would also like to thank Kelly
Behre, Josh Braver, Jill Engle, Marie-Amelie George, Susan Hazeldean, Matthew Lawrence, Medha Makhlouf, Allison Tait, and all the participants in the University of Richmond Mid-Atlantic Junior Faculty Forum and the Works in Progress Session of the
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1. McCoy v. Bd. of Educ., 515 F. App’x 387, 389–90 (6th Cir. 2013).
2. Id. at 389.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
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consequently putting Doe at risk for the abuse he ultimately suffered,
the claim failed. 6 The court found that the school district had not
transgressed Title IX’s deliberate indifference standard and, therefore, did not violate Title IX.7
Title IX prohibits sex discrimination, including in the form of sexual harassment and assault, in the public schools.8 It has powerful potential to require schools to protect students from sexual harassment
and abuse. 9 Its potential, though, is largely unrealized in the K–12
public school context.10 John Doe’s case is not an outlier.11
This Article argues that the lower federal courts’ evaluations of
the deliberate indifference standard in K–12 public school students’
Title IX claims drastically circumscribe the standard’s meaning.12 The
courts consequently permit K–12 public schools to respond to student
sexual harassment in virtually any way other than not at all, including
in ways that put students at risk for and indirectly cause sexual harassment.13 Through their crabbed evaluations of the deliberate indifference standard, the courts allow the K–12 public schools to mete out
the very kinds of harms the standard can protect against.14
To determine whether a public school violated Title IX, the Supreme Court has said that courts must inquire into whether the school
had actual notice of sexual harassment, and if so, acted with deliberate

6. Id. at 391.
7. Id.
8. 20 U.S.C. § 1681.
9. See infra Part II.A.
10. See infra Parts I.A–C.
11. See infra Parts I.A–C.
12. See infra Part I.D. This Article focuses on federal courts of appeals’ decisions
in no small part because their determinations generally bind subsequent decisions in
the same circuit. See, e.g., United States v. Rodríguez, 527 F.3d 221, 224 (1st Cir. 2008)
(explaining that the “law of the circuit” doctrine is a corollary of the principle of stare
decisis and that it preserves and protects the judiciary’s commitment to finality, stability, and certainty in the law). This Article focuses on K–12 public school students’
claims because the federal courts of appeals consistently apply the deliberate indifference standard in the vapid ways identified here in evaluating those students’ claims
but, counterintuitively, do not consistently do so in college and university students’
Title IX claims. See infra notes 74, 231 and accompanying text. That discrepancy in the
courts’ treatment of Title IX claims merits deeper analysis but is beyond the scope of
this Article.
13. See infra Part I.D. For simplicity, unless otherwise noted references to “sexual
harassment” generally in this Article include sexual harassment of any sort, including
sexual assaults.
14. See infra Part II.A.
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indifference to it. 15 The deliberate indifference standard, therefore,
sets the minimum bar for schools’ responses to sexual harassment
that they know has occurred. 16 Scholars have rightly critiqued this
standard as enabling outcomes like those in John Doe’s case.17 What
has thus far gone overlooked in those critiques, however, is how the
lower courts’ evaluations of the deliberate indifference standard do
much of this enabling work in K–12 public school students’ claims.18
The deliberate indifference standard need not preclude recovery in
cases like John Doe’s. 19 To the contrary, federal courts could work
within the standard’s parameters to articulate Title IX’s obligations
forcefully and impose liability when public schools act as vacuously as
in John Doe’s case.20 Instead, the lower courts’ assessments send the
message that Title IX contains almost no obligations that the K–12
public schools are bound to respect. 21 The deliberate indifference
standard as outlined by the Supreme Court may be imperfect, but it
can require far more of the public schools than the lower courts’ evaluations of it do.22
Explaining the deliberate indifference standard, the Supreme
Court said that “at a minimum” it precludes schools’ responses to
known sexual harassment that “‘cause [students] to undergo’ [additional] harassment or ‘make them liable or vulnerable’ to it.” 23 The
standard, therefore, can inquire into whether schools acted in
15. Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 292–93 (1998); Davis ex
rel. LaShonda D. v. Monroe Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 647 (1999).
16. Gebser, 524 U.S. at 292–93; Davis, 526 U.S. at 647.
17. See, e.g., Catharine A. MacKinnon, In Their Hands: Restoring Institutional Liability for Sexual Harassment in Education, 125 YALE L.J. 2038, 2091–92 (2016) (“The
concept of deliberate indifference, which centers on conscious choice and is measured
in unreasonableness of procedural steps rather than in substantive equality outcomes,
produces an incentive for schools to go through the motions with an eye primarily to
looking as if action is being taken, rather than to redressing the injury, stopping the
abuse, or addressing the climate in the environment that produced and permitted it.”);
Emily Suski, The School Civil Rights Vacuum, 66 UCLA L. REV. 720, 740 (2019) (arguing
both that the actual notice and deliberate indifference prongs of the Title IX standard
for evaluation “create high thresholds for school Title IX liability, and students struggle
to hold schools liable for peer sexual harassment” and that those liability limits are
based on misconceptions).
18. See MacKinnon, supra note 17 and accompanying text; Suski, supra note 17
and accompanying text; infra Part II.B.2.
19. See infra Part II.A.
20. See infra Part II.A.
21. See infra Parts I.A–C.
22. See infra Part II.A.
23. Davis ex rel. LaShonda D. v. Monroe Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 645
(1999).
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response to student sexual harassment in ways that protected students from suffering further sexual harassment or even just the risk
of, or vulnerability to, it.24 Given that Title IX’s purpose is to protect
students from sexual harassment, this conceptualization of deliberate
indifference makes sense.25
Yet, in evaluating the deliberate indifference standard in K–12
public school students’ Title IX claims, the lower courts disregard this
meaning. 26 Instead, they rely almost solely on the Supreme Court’s
further guidance that schools are not deliberately indifferent if they
act in a manner that is “not clearly unreasonable.”27 Rather than evaluating the reasonableness, or more accurately the unreasonableness,
of schools’ responses to student sexual harassment by examining
whether those responses indirectly caused or put students at risk for
more sexual harassment, the lower courts take this “not clearly unreasonable” language entirely out of the context in which the Court offered it.28 They evaluate schools’ responses to student sexual harassment for clear unreasonableness alone, as they independently
conceive of it.29 They thus void the deliberate indifference standard of
its complete content.30 Consequently, K–12 public schools can evade
Title IX liability by offering essentially any response at all to student
sexual harassment and assault, since practically any response negates
deliberate indifference.31
Although the courts allow K–12 public schools to respond to student sexual harassment in virtually any way other than not at all, these
permitted responses can nevertheless be classified into one of three
types.32 First, the courts permit schools to intermittently not respond
to reports of student sexual harassment.33 Second, they allow schools
to repeat failed or otherwise inadequate responses to sexual harassment.34 Third, the courts sanction schools’ responses that blame and
punish the survivors of sexual harassment.35
24. See infra Part II.A.
25. Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677 (1979); see infra note 60 and accompanying text.
26. See infra Part II.B.2.
27. Davis, 526 U.S. at 648.
28. See infra Part II.B.2.
29. See infra Part II.B.2.
30. See infra Part II.B.2.
31. See infra Parts I.A–C, II.B.2.
32. See infra Parts I.A–C.
33. See infra Part I.A.
34. See infra Part I.B.
35. See infra Part I.C.
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These responses both put students at risk for and indirectly cause
them to actually suffer more sexual harassment.36 These responses effectively allow student sexual harassment to recur unchecked by the
public schools.37 Further, they work more direct harms. Schools’ responses that punish and blame survivors directly cause students secondary traumas and institutional betrayals.38 Secondary traumas and
institutional betrayals occur when an individual or institutional response to sexual harassment and assault itself causes additional
trauma to the survivors.39 Such trauma can be as or more severe than
the trauma of the harassment itself.40 If the courts applied the deliberate indifference standard with fidelity to the Supreme Court’s full
explanation of it, they could proscribe schools’ responses to student
sexual harassment that both indirectly cause students to suffer further harassment and directly cause these related traumas.41 Instead,
through their evaluations of deliberate indifference, the courts effectively allow the K–12 schools to act as instruments of these harms.42
The courts, thus, subvert Title IX in purpose and effect.
Were sexual harassment and assault in the public schools a rare
occurrence, the courts’ evaluations of deliberate indifference might be
of relatively little moment. To the contrary, sexual harassment occurs
by the thousands each year in the public schools. 43 From 2011 to
2015, at least 17,000 K–12 public school students reported experiencing sexual assault. 44 When the courts assess schools’ responses to
36. See infra Part I.D.
37. See infra Part I.D.1.
38. See infra Part I.D.3.
39. See Lindsay M. Orchowski & Christine A. Gidycz, To Whom Do College Women
Confide Following Sexual Assault? A Prospective Study of Predictors of Sexual Assault Disclosure and Social Reactions, 18 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 264, 266 (2012); see also
Shana L. Maier, Sexual Assault Nurse Examiners’ Perceptions of the Revictimization of
Rape Victims, 27 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 287, 289 (2012); Carly Parnitzke Smith &
Jennifer J. Freyd, Institutional Betrayal, 69 AM. PSYCH. 575, 578 (2014).
40. See Orchowski & Gidycz, supra note 39; see also Maier, supra note 39; Smith &
Freyd, supra note 39.
41. See infra Part II.B.
42. See infra Parts I.D, II.B.2.
43. See infra notes 44–45 and accompanying text.
44. Likely the number is far higher than that as much of the sexual harassment
and assault in school goes unreported. One study found that only nine percent of students in grades seven through twelve who experienced some form of sexual harassment in school reported it. CATHERINE HILL & HOLLY KEARL, AM. ASS’N OF UNIV. WOMEN
(AAUW), CROSSING THE LINE: SEXUAL HARASSMENT AT SCHOOL 2 (2011), https://www
.aauw.org/app/uploads/2020/03/Crossing-the-Line-Sexual-Harassment-at-School
.pdf [https://perma.cc/SGD4-6MZB]. As further illustration of how the aggregate numbers of reported sexual assault underrepresent the problem, a recent journalistic
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sexual harassment, therefore, they determine the degree of protection, or lack thereof, that schools must provide for the thousands of
students who suffer it annually.45 Through their evaluations of the deliberate indifference standard, the courts have determined that K–12
public school students have very little protection under Title IX.46
In making these arguments, this Article contributes to the scholarly literature on Title IX by offering an original taxonomy of K–12
public schools’ responses to student sexual harassment that courts
deem permissible.47 Further, it is the first to point out how the lower
courts’ interpretations of the law go beyond just requiring very little
to demonstrate how they legitimize schools’ actions that both risk and
actually cause students’ sexual harassment as well as related
trauma.48 Although other scholars have critiqued the deliberate indifference standard on different bases49 and a number have separately
analyzed the ways laws impose secondary harms, none have explored

investigation found thousands of incidences of sexual harassment and assault in the
Nashville Public Schools alone over a five-year period. Anita Wadhwani & Dave Boucher, Special Report: Court Filings Reveal Thousands of Sexual Misconduct Cases in Nashville Schools, TENNESSEAN (May 14, 2018), https://www.tennessean.com/story/news/
2018/05/14/sexual-misconduct-nashville-schools-lawsuits/587588002 [https://
perma.cc/5YPV-9TR3].
45. HILL & KEARL, supra note 44. More recent research finds similar results. The
Let Her Learn Survey reports that twenty-one percent of girls in elementary and secondary schools report being “kissed or touched without consent.” KAYLA PATRICK &
NEENA CHAUDHRY, NAT’L WOMEN’S L. CTR., LET HER LEARN: STOPPING SCHOOL PUSHOUT FOR
GIRLS WHO HAVE SUFFERED HARASSMENT AND SEXUAL VIOLENCE 3 (2017), https://nwlc
.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/final_nwlc_Gates_HarassmentViolence.pdf
[https://perma.cc/C9QD-MS9B]. The percentages are even higher when broken down
by sexual orientation, race, and ethnicity. Thirty-eight percent of LGBTQ girls, twentythree percent of Native American girls, and twenty-two percent of Black girls report
such unwanted touching. Id.
46. See infra Parts I, II.B.2.
47. This Article builds upon my previous scholarship analyzing the ways that the
courts’ assessments of Title IX’s actual notice standard create a decisional paradox for
students and how the courts more generally create stringent liability limits for students’ civil rights claims based on misconceptions. Emily Suski, The Title IX Paradox,
108 CALIF. L. REV. 1147 (2020); Suski, supra note 17, at 725 (“[T]he courts unjustifiably
limit public school liability under these Fourteenth Amendment and Title IX claims for
students’ verbal, physical, and sexual harassment and abuse. This jurisprudence is limited due in large part to courts’ misconceptions about both families and schools.”).
48. See infra Parts I.D, II.B.2.
49. Catharine MacKinnon has leveled an exacting critique of the deliberate indifference standard on the basis of equality principles. MacKinnon, supra note 17, at
2091–92; see also Suski, supra note 17, at 754–56.
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the way the lower courts undermine the meaning of that standard and
permit schools to impose more harm on students.50
To resurrect the right to be free from sexual harassment under
Title IX, this Article makes three recommendations. First, it proposes
recasting the judicially devised deliberate indifference standard in Title IX claims such that it expressly calls for schools to affirmatively
protect students from sexual harassment.51 To effectuate this change,
this Article offers a framework for evaluating this recast standard and
factors for grappling with its analysis so lower courts can no longer
disregard the complete meaning of the deliberate indifference standard. 52 Second, this Article develops a new legal presumption to
prompt schools’ considered responses to reports of sexual harassment and assault.53 More specifically, this presumption would operate
such that upon proof of a school’s repeated use of failed responses, the
school would be presumed deliberately indifferent.54 The burden of
proof would then shift to the public schools to demonstrate otherwise. 55 Third, this Article recommends related policy and doctrinal
changes that would require schools to implement a written plan for
preventing sexual harassment and ameliorating its effects.56
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I offers a tripartite taxonomy of K–12 schools’ vapid, but permissible, responses to student
sexual harassment and assault. It also demonstrates how these types
of responses contravene Title IX’s purpose of protecting students
50. Scholars have discussed the impact and significance of secondary trauma and
institutional betrayal on domestic violence survivors. E.g., Deborah Epstein & Lisa A.
Goodman, Discounting Women: Doubting Domestic Violence Survivors’ Credibility and
Dismissing Their Experiences, 167 U. PA. L. REV. 399, 449 (2019) (“Survivors suffer a
range of harms when they find that their experiences are repeatedly discredited and
invalidated. . . . First, survivors develop a sense of powerlessness and futility . . . . This is
a feeling akin to how numerous survivors eventually come to feel in their abusive relationships; there is nothing they can say or do that will make the perpetrator of violence hear or really ‘see’ me.”). Others have discussed these harms in the context of
hate crimes. E.g., Lu-in Wang, The Transforming Power of “Hate”: Social Cognition Theory and the Harms of Bias-Related Crime, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 47, 99 (1997) (noting secondary trauma can contribute to a hate crime victim “undergo[ing] a change in selfimage, tending to focus on his own deficiencies, rather than on how dangerous the
world is”). Some have also considered secondary trauma in the context of child abuse
matters. E.g., Leonard P. Edwards & Inger J. Sagatun, Who Speaks for the Child?, 2 U. CHI.
L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 67, 76 (1995).
51. See infra Part III.A.
52. See infra Part III.A.
53. See infra Part III.B.
54. See infra Part III.B.
55. See infra Part III.B.
56. See infra Part III.C.
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from sexual harassment and assaults in school. First, they put students
at risk for further sexual harassment such that they then lose educational benefits even if they never actually endure further sexual harassment. Second, they indirectly cause students to in fact suffer further sexual harassment and assaults. Third, schools’ interventions
that blame and punish survivors directly cause students to undergo
secondary traumas as well as institutional betrayals. Part II explains
that these consequences are far from the inevitable result of the necessary application of the deliberate indifference standard. To the contrary, the deliberate indifference standard as described by the Supreme Court comports with Title IX’s protective purpose and can
require that schools act to prevent the very harms that the lower
courts now permit. This Part contends, however, that the lower courts
eviscerate the deliberate indifference standard’s protective potential
in evaluating K–12 public school students’ claims by cleaving the
standard’s full meaning from their assessments of it. Further, the
courts’ failure to require more of schools in response to student sexual
harassment is particularly problematic for K–12 public school students. These students already have fewer structural protections and a
higher likelihood of negative long-term outcomes from sexual harassment than do older students.57 As a remedy, Part III proposes reworking the deliberate indifference standard and a framework for its evaluation as well as a new legal presumption and regulatory revisions.
All of these recommended changes hold the promise of revitalizing Title IX’s purpose and protections.
I. UNDERMINING TITLE IX’S CENTRAL PURPOSE: A TAXONOMY OF
SCHOOLS’ VAPID, YET PERMISSIBLE, RESPONSES TO STUDENT
SEXUAL HARASSMENT
In a quartet of cases decided in the two decades following Title
IX’s enactment, the Supreme Court laid out the contours and meaning
of the law’s blunt mandate that “no person . . . shall, on the basis of sex,
be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination” in publicly funded educational programs.58
In the first of those cases, Cannon v. University of Chicago, the Court
identified Title IX’s purpose as protecting students from sex

57. See infra notes 308, 310 and accompanying text.
58. 20 U.S.C. § 1681; Davis ex rel. Lashonda D. v. Monroe Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 526
U.S. 629, 643 (1999); Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 292–93
(1998); Franklin v. Gwinnett Cnty. Pub. Schs., 503 U.S. 60, 76 (1992); Cannon v. Univ.
of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 709 (1979).
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discrimination in the public schools.59 It said that Congress enacted
Title IX because it “wanted to provide individual citizens effective protection against those [discriminatory] practices.” 60 The Court also
concluded that Title IX has an implied private right of action. 61 In
Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public School, the Court then held that
damages are available for Title IX’s violation.62
In the final two of those cases, Gebser v. Lago Vista Independent
School District and Davis v. Monroe County Board of Education, the Supreme Court determined that sexual harassment of students by peers
as well as teachers constitutes sex discrimination, and public schools
could be liable for both.63 In both Gebser and Davis, the Court established deliberate indifference as the standard for assessing public
schools’ liability for such harassment and assault. 64 More precisely,
the Court said that once schools have actual notice of sexual harassment or assault, they would be liable if they then act with deliberate
59. Cannon, 441 U.S. at 704.
60. Id. The Court drew on Title IX’s legislative history to discern and distill these
two purposes, noting this protective purpose was “repeatedly identified in the debates
on the two statutes.” Id.
61. Id. at 717. The Court reasoned:
[The public remedy through the United States Department of Education] may
not provide an appropriate means of accomplishing the second purpose if
merely an isolated violation has occurred. . . . [I]n that kind of situation it
makes little sense to impose on an individual . . . the burden of demonstrating
that an institution’s practices are so pervasively discriminatory that a complete cutoff of federal funding is appropriate.
Id. at 704–05.
62. Franklin, 503 U.S. at 76.
63. Gebser, 524 U.S. at 290; Davis, 526 U.S. at 643. Although Title IX prohibits sex
discrimination by any school employee, for the sake for simplicity here all such harassment no matter whether it is carried out by a staff member, teacher, or administrator is referred to as “teacher,” as distinguished from peer, sexual harassment. See
Gebser, 524 U.S. at 292–93.
64. Gebser, 524 U.S. at 290; Davis, 526 U.S. at 643. The Court drew on recent police
failure to train and inadequate employee screening cases when it adopted deliberate
indifference as the measure of schools’ responses to student sexual harassment.
Gebser, 524 U.S. at 291. In one of those cases, City of Canton v. Harris, the Court held
that “the inadequacy of police training may serve as the basis for § 1983 liability only
where the failure to train amounts to deliberate indifference to the rights of persons
with whom the police come into contact.” 489 U.S. 378, 388 (1989). In Board of Commissioners v. Brown, the Court said:
Only where adequate scrutiny of an applicant’s background would lead a reasonable policymaker to conclude that the plainly obvious consequence of the
decision to hire the applicant would be the deprivation of a third party’s federally protected right can the official’s failure to adequately scrutinize the applicant’s background constitute [the requisite] “deliberate indifference.”
520 U.S. 397, 411 (1997).
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indifference to it and the child is deprived of access to the educational
benefits or opportunities at school. 65 The deliberate indifference
standard, therefore, operates as the vehicle for assessing schools’ responses to sexual harassment and realizing Title IX’s protective purpose.66
Because the Supreme Court dispensed with Gebser on the basis of
the actual notice prong of this test, it did more to explain deliberate
indifference a year later in Davis.67 In Davis, fifth grade student Lashonda Davis was subjected to a “prolonged pattern of sexual harassment” by a classmate.68 Although the school knew about the harassment, it “made no effort whatsoever either to investigate or to put an
end to the harassment.”69 The Court therefore found that the school
acted with deliberate indifference.70 The Court did not explicitly say,
however, what types of responses other than the total non-response
by the school in Davis would constitute deliberate indifference.71 In
the twenty years since the Court adopted the deliberate indifference
standard in Davis, though, the lower courts have had occasion to consider this question.72 They regularly find that any response by K–12
public schools to student sexual harassment other than none at all satisfies the deliberate indifference standard.73
Given that the lower courts tolerate virtually any response by K–
12 public schools to sexual harassment and assault, those myriad
65. Gebser, 524 U.S. at 290; Davis, 526 U.S. at 650 (“We thus conclude that
[schools] are properly held liable in damages only where they are deliberately indifferent to sexual harassment, of which they have actual knowledge, that is so severe,
pervasive, and objectively offensive that it can be said to deprive the victims of access
to the educational opportunities or benefits provided by the school.”).
66. See Davis, 526 U.S. at 643.
67. Gebser, 524 U.S. at 291 (“Applying the framework to this case is fairly straightforward, as petitioners do not contend they can prevail under an actual notice standard.”); Davis, 526 U.S. at 643–45.
68. Davis, 526 U.S. at 633.
69. Id. at 654.
70. Id.
71. See id.
72. See infra Parts I.A–C.
73. See infra Parts I.A–C; infra note 289 and accompanying text. In the early years
after the Supreme Court decided Gebser and Davis, at least one scholar presciently recognized that the lower courts’ Title IX jurisprudence could develop in this way such
that only the most severe sexual harassment would be covered by its protections. Deborah L. Brake, School Liability for Peer Sexual Harassment After Davis: Shifting from Intent to Causation in Discrimination Law, 12 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 5, 27–28 (2001)
(“There is a danger that courts will apply the deliberate indifference test so strictly as
to exclude from liability all but those most egregious cases where schools take no action whatsoever in the face of the most severe forms of harassment.”).
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responses might seem immune to classification. 74 To the contrary,
they can be classified into three general types.75 First, the courts allow
schools to intermittently not respond to student sexual harassment.76
Second, they permit schools to repeatedly implement the same failed
responses to it.77 Third, they sanction schools’ inverted responses that
blame and punish survivors of sexual harassment. 78 Because in the
courts’ assessments all three types of responses suffice to show that
the public schools have not acted with deliberate indifference, K–12
public school students’ Title IX claims based on all three types of responses regularly fail.79
These claims fail even though each of these three types of responses has real, harmful consequences for students.80 All three types
put students at risk for more sexual harassment in ways that deny the
students the educational benefits of school. 81 They also indirectly
cause students to actually suffer further sexual harassment.82 In addition, these inverted responses inflict direct harms on students.83 They
cause students to undergo secondary trauma and institutional

74. See supra Parts I.A–C. Courts have been at least somewhat more willing to find
deliberate indifference in the college and university context. See, e.g., Farmer v. Kan.
State Univ., 918 F.3d 1094, 1103–04 (10th Cir. 2019); Williams v. Bd. of Regents, 477
F.3d 1282, 1296 (11th Cir. 2007) (stating that the University of Georgia’s “failure to
inform its student-athletes about the applicable sexual harassment policy and failure
to supervise its student-athletes subjected Williams to this further harassment and
caused Williams to be the victim of a conspiracy between Cole, Brandon Williams, and
Thomas to sexually assault and rape her”). Courts are generally, though unjustifiably,
reticent to hold K–12 schools liable for harms that happen to children, including sexual
harassment and assault. See Suski, supra note 17 and accompanying text.
75. See infra Parts I.A–C.
76. See infra Part I.A.
77. See infra Part I.B.
78. See infra Part I.C.
79. See infra notes 90, 92, 98, 102–03, 131, 136, 140 and accompanying text. To
be sure, the courts do find some Title IX claims at least make out a colorable claim of
deliberate indifference. See Hill v. Cundiff, 797 F.3d 948 (11th Cir. 2015); infra note
223 and accompanying text. However, many more Title IX claims do not. See MacKinnon, supra note 17, at 2069 (“[A] close reading of all the Title IX cases decided in the
federal courts in 2015 that substantially discuss the deliberate indifference standard,
together with an assessment of the many brought in the years since Gebser, shows a
vast disproportion between the number of cases that have lost on deliberate indifference and those that have won.”).
80. See infra Part I.D.
81. See, e.g., Rost ex rel. K.C. v. Steamboat Springs RE-2 Sch. Dist., 511 F.3d 1114
(10th Cir. 2008); infra notes 157, 164 and accompanying text.
82. See infra Parts I.D.1–2.
83. See infra Part I.D.3.
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betrayals.84 By allowing these three types of responses, therefore, the
courts undermine Title IX’s animating purpose of protecting students
from sex discrimination, including sexual harassment, in the public
schools.85
A. SCHOOLS’ INTERMITTENT FAILURES TO RESPOND TO STUDENT SEXUAL
HARASSMENT
Courts regularly allow schools to respond only intermittently to
student sexual harassment. If a school does anything in response to
student sexual harassment, even if only sporadically, the lower courts
find that such occasional responses inoculate schools’ other instances
of not responding to sexual harassment.86 The courts come to these
conclusions both in cases where multiple students serially engage in
months- and even years-long sexual harassment of another student
and in cases in which an individual teacher or student repeatedly harasses one or more students.87 In either set of circumstances, the courts
find schools’ intermittent failures to respond to student sexual harassment not deliberately indifferent.88
When multiple students engage in a veritable tag-team of harassment against another student over months or even years, some courts
treat the harassment as one wide-ranging experience that is simply
comprised of many instances.89 By treating many individual instances
of harassment as one whole, these courts use a school’s only occasional response to sexual harassment as sufficient to address the entirety of it.90 Other courts do the opposite and treat such harassment
84. See infra Part I.D.3.
85. See infra Part I.D.
86. See infra notes 90, 92, 98, 100, 102 and accompanying text.
87. See infra notes 90, 92, 98, 100, 102 and accompanying text.
88. See infra notes 90, 92, 98, 100, 102 and accompanying text.
89. In cases in which a student is repeatedly harassed by multiple individuals, the
perpetrators are typically other students. See, e.g., K.S. v. Nw. Indep. Sch. Dist., 689 F.
App’x 780 (5th Cir. 2017); Stiles ex rel. D.S. v. Grainger Cnty., 819 F.3d 834 (6th Cir.
2016); Rost ex rel. K.C. v. Steamboat Springs RE-2 Sch. Dist., 511 F.3d 1114 (10th Cir.
2008). When one individual repeatedly harasses another or others, both teachers and
students commit that repeated harassment. See, e.g., Doe v. Bd. of Educ., 605 F. App’x
159 (4th Cir. 2015); McCoy v. Bd. of Educ., 515 F. App’x 387 (6th Cir. 2013); Doe ex rel.
Doe v. Dall. Indep. Sch. Dist., 220 F.3d 380 (5th Cir. 2000).
90. The Fifth and Tenth Circuits, for example, stretched the concept of one-to-one
correspondence in this way. K.S., 689 F. App’x at 785; Rost, 511 F.3d 1114. In K.S. v.
Northwest Independent School District, sixth grade student K.S. suffered sexual harassment by multiple students on the bus, in school hallways, and in locker rooms. 689 F.
App’x at 781. The other students called him “names such as ‘titty boy’ and ‘Teddy titty
baby’” and “would touch and even twist his breasts.” Id. Although the school sometimes
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as merely a succession of separate and isolated incidents.91 By treating broader patterns of harassment as only a series of atomized instances, those courts avoid concluding that schools’ inconsistent responses should have more comprehensively addressed the larger
pattern.92 Under either treatment, the courts find that schools’ only
intermittent responses to student sexual harassment are not deliberately indifferent.93
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, in a feat of doublethink, has
treated repeated sexual harassment both as one over-arching experience and as a succession of disconnected incidents, all to the end of
finding no deliberate indifference on the part of the school.94 In Stiles
v. Grainger County, multiple students repeatedly verbally harassed
middle school student D.S. over the course of two school years. 95
Among other things, the students called him “bitch,” “faggot,” and
responded to the harassment “but not always,” the Fifth Circuit found the school was
not clearly unreasonable and therefore not deliberately indifferent because it took
“some action” and “took relatively strong action to deal with the overall situation.” Id.
at 784–85. By relying on the school’s “overall” response, therefore, the court demonstrates its treatment of the sexual harassment as a whole. Id. In Rost ex rel. K.C. v. Steamboat Springs RE-2 School District, seventh grade student K.C. was subjected to multiple
instances of harassment by other students. 511 F.3d at 1117. Although the school
turned the investigation over to law enforcement, when the prosecutor’s office declined to prosecute, the school then did nothing at all at school itself to address the
harassment. Id. at 1123. In finding the school’s failure to do anything at that point not
“deliberately indifferent,” the Tenth Circuit noted that the school need not have engaged in any particular discipline of the students, but it did not analyze why no discipline or other response by the school to the sexual harassment sufficed. Id. It thereby
arguably treated the law enforcement investigation as a sufficient response to the
whole months-long pattern of harassment. Id.
91. See infra notes 92, 98 and accompanying text.
92. See infra note 102 and accompanying text. For example, in Doe v. Board of Education, student J.D. endured repeated harassment and assaults by student M.O. over
two school years. 605 F. App’x at 161–62. At times, the school did nothing in response
to reports of the harassment. Id. J.D. argued, among other things, that the school acted
with deliberate indifference by failing to treat the harassment as “part of an escalating
pattern.” Id. at 167. The court rejected that argument and instead affirmed the lower
court’s finding that “each instance of sexual harassment was an isolated incident rather
than part of an escalating pattern.” Id. Yet the court neither explained why those many
individual incidents should not have been treated as part of a broader pattern nor addressed why the failures to respond to some such individual incidents did not constitute a deliberately indifferent response. See id.
93. See supra notes 90, 92 and accompanying text; infra notes 98, 102 and accompanying text.
94. Stiles ex rel. D.S. v. Grainger Cnty., 819 F.3d 834 (6th Cir. 2016). Stiles represented a repeat of this feat. The Sixth Circuit first accomplished such doublethink three
years earlier in McCoy v. Board of Education. 515 F. App’x 387 (6th Cir. 2013).
95. 819 F.3d at 841–45.

2272

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[105:2259

“queer” almost every day and physically harassed him, including by
shoving and punching him.96 All told, at least eleven students harassed
D.S. during his seventh and eighth grade years in school.97 Sometimes
the school responded to reports of the harassment, but other times it
did nothing at all.98
In evaluating these non-responses to D.S.’s extensive harassment,
the Sixth Circuit justified its conclusion that the school was not deliberately indifferent to D.S.’s sexual harassment by noting that the
school did investigate some of the sexual harassment and discipline
some of the students involved. 99 Effectively, then, the response to
some harassment served as a response to what the court called D.S.’s
“overall” experience of harassment.100 While that might consequently
suggest that a broader response would be required to address the
broader nature of the harassment, the court avoided such a conclusion
by also treating the harassment as a series of isolated incidents. 101
Noting that “the record in this case reveals almost no repeat perpetrators, nor any connection or conspiracy among the reported perpetrators,” it found that the school needed not have undertaken any comprehensive response to the harassment to demonstrate it did not act
in a deliberately indifferent way.102

96. Id. at 841–42.
97. Id. at 841–45.
98. Id. at 841. The school did nothing in response to some of student C.B.’s harassment of D.S. even though he harassed D.S. at least three times in the space of a few
months. Id. The school also did not discipline or otherwise address student S.P.’s harassment of D.S. because the school believed that S.P. “was truly remorseful.” Id. at 842.
In addition, the school did not implement a response to student B.M.’s harassment of
D.S. because the principal “assumed . . . mom handled the situation.” Id. at 845.
99. Id. at 850.
100. Id. (positively evaluating the school’s “overall response[s]” as not deliberately
indifferent by not distinguishing between multiple incidents over two years).
101. Id.
102. Id. The court also said the school’s inconsistent, partial responses were sufficient because they involved “one-and-a-half years of similar, but not rote, responses.”
Id. at 851. The court’s reasoning therefore suggests that only by meting out the exact
same discipline in both kind and length repeatedly can schools potentially demonstrate deliberate indifference. See id. Further, while that’s an unlikely set of facts for a
student to prove, even if a student could make such a showing, the court did not suggest any comprehensive response to the overall harassment might even then be required. See id.
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B. SCHOOLS’ REPEATED USE OF FAILED OR OTHERWISE INADEQUATE
RESPONSES TO STUDENT SEXUAL HARASSMENT
Beyond determining whether schools have at least occasionally
addressed a student’s sexual harassment, the courts generally do not
otherwise evaluate the quality or substance of a school’s response to
student sexual harassment. 103 They essentially inquire only into
whether a response occurred, not whether the response was in any
way designed to address or prevent the harassment.104 Consequently,
103. Although in Stiles the Sixth Circuit insisted it was evaluating the “strength of
the school’s remedial response,” it really did nothing more than count responses. Id. at
850. It merely catalogued a list of the school’s responses as consisting of “multiple investigations, several in-school suspensions, and class scheduling that separated DS
from his harassers” to find no clearly unreasonable and therefore deliberately indifferent actions or inactions. Id. In doing so it also sought to distinguish two previous Sixth
Circuit cases, Vance v. Spencer County Public School District and Patterson v. Hudson
Area Schools, which stand out as exceptions to the general approach courts take of not
evaluating the substance of the school’s responses. 231 F.3d 253 (6th Cir. 2000); 551
F.3d 438 (6th Cir. 2009). In both Vance and Patterson, the Sixth Circuit found the
school’s repeated ineffective responses to student sexual harassment constituted deliberate indifference. 231 F.3d at 261–62; 551 F.3d at 448–49. With its subsequent decisions in McCoy and Stiles, however, the Sixth Circuit has taken a jurisprudential turn
away from such evaluations. See Stiles, 819 F.3d 834; supra note 102 (explaining the
Stiles court’s approach); McCoy v. Bd. of Educ., 515 F. App’x 387 (6th Cir. 2013); infra
note 130 and accompanying text (explaining the McCoy court’s approach). To make
this turn, the Stiles court distinguished Vance and Patterson by noting, without any apparent sense of irony, that D.S.’s school “never abandoned an effective solution.” Stiles,
819 F.3d at 850. The school, however, never implemented an effective solution that it
could abandon, as the court noted when it said, “We acknowledge that the school’s remedial measures did not eliminate DS’s problems with other students.” Id. at 849.
104. Although courts are more commonly called to consider whether schools’ repetition of failed responses to student sexual harassment constitute deliberate indifference, they also have evaluated whether other kinds of poorly designed responses violate the standard. For example, in Gabrielle M. v. Park Forest-Chicago Heights, the
Seventh Circuit found that the school’s incompletely implemented response to kindergartener Gabrielle M.’s sexual harassment and assaults by student Jason was not
clearly unreasonable and therefore not deliberately indifferent. 315 F.3d 817, 819–20,
824 (7th Cir. 2003). Although the school determined that it should separate the students, including by putting them in different kindergarten classes, it did not always or
fully separate the children. Id. at 819–20. For example, the school permitted Gabrielle
and Jason to have lunch and recess together, where they came into contact and Gabrielle said that Jason “wanted to play with me funny ways.” Id. at 820. The school did
instruct a supervisor to “ensure that the two students did not interact at recess,” but
they nonetheless came in contact given that they were not fully separated. Id. at 824.
Further, that they came into contact hardly should have surprised the school because
at least two kindergarten classes played at the same time at recess. Id. at 820. With so
many children to supervise, it would have been a challenge for one recess monitor to
watch all of those children and ensure Jason did not come into contact with Gabrielle.
See id. Yet the court found this partially implemented response to Gabrielle’s abuse not
deliberately indifferent. Id. at 824.
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courts regularly conclude that when schools repeat failed responses
or implement responses otherwise inadequate to address the sexual
harassment, those responses satisfy the deliberate indifference standard.105
For example, in Porto v. Town of Tewksbury, the First Circuit
found a school was not deliberately indifferent despite its repeated
use of the same failed response to the harassment of eight-year-old
student S.C.106 S.C., who had generalized developmental delays, suffered six years of sexual harassment and assault by student R.C. 107
R.C.’s harassment of S.C. began in S.C.’s first grade year in school and
lasted through seventh grade, when S.C. left the school and tragically
attempted suicide.108 S.C.’s mother reported the problems with R.C. as
she learned of them, including her report in S.C.’s fifth grade year that
R.C. had oral sex with S.C. on the school bus.109 In response to all of
this harassment, the school repeatedly imposed limited physical separations on R.C. and S.C. that failed to stop the ongoing pattern of harassment. 110 Instead, the school’s interventions allowed the harassment to reoccur at other times and in other locations in school. 111
Then, in the fall of S.C.’s seventh grade year, despite this six-year long
history of R.C. sexually harassing S.C., the school put R.C. and S.C. in
the same classroom.112 With such easy access to S.C., R.C. again inappropriately touched S.C. multiple times in the month of October
alone.113 To address R.C.’s behavior, the school once again physically
separated the boys but only very partially.114 School staff moved the
boys’ classroom seats away from each other but kept the boys in the
same classroom. 115 Then, just two months later, R.C. committed his

105. See supra notes 103–04 and accompanying text; infra note 129 and accompanying text.
106. 488 F.3d 67, 69 (1st Cir. 2007).
107. Id. at 70.
108. Id. at 70, 72.
109. Id. at 70.
110. Id. at 70–72.
111. Id. For example, in response to the report that the boys had oral sex on the
bus, the school separated the boys by putting them on different buses but then did not
separate them elsewhere or during the following school year. Id. at 70. R.C. then continued to sexually harass S.C. the following year by inappropriately touching him. Id. In
response to this continued harassment, the school again physically separated R.C. from
S.C., but the harassment still continued. Id.
112. Id. at 70–71.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 71.
115. Id.
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final and one of his most severe assaults on S.C.116 On that morning
both boys obtained permission to leave their classroom in short succession of each other. 117 When neither boy returned after a few
minutes, a school staff member went to the bathroom to look for the
boys.118 There he discovered that R.C. had sexually assaulted S.C.119 At
that point, S.C. brought a Title IX claim against the school based on this
long pattern of sexual harassment and the school’s insistent use of
failed responses to it.120
However, S.C.’s Title IX claim failed.121 It failed because the First
Circuit rejected S.C.’s assertion “that the school system . . . should have
done more” than repeatedly use limited physical separations to address R.C.’s recurring abuse of S.C.122 Almost inexplicably, given R.C.’s
multi-year history of sexually harassing S.C., the court found that the
school had a basis for believing the partial physical separations of the
boys had stopped the harassment. 123 It determined that because
weeks and sometimes months went by without reports of more sexual
harassment, the school had cause to conclude that its interventions
had worked.124 With this reasoning, however, the court ignored that
those periods without reported harassment were nothing more than
temporary breaks in the years-long pattern of ongoing harassment.125
That is, at some point during this six-year period, it arguably should
have become apparent to the school that the limited physical separations were insufficient to address the persistently recurring harassment.126 By disregarding the full, ongoing nature of the harassment,
though, the court avoided evaluating the inadequacy of the school’s
repeated partial separation interventions in this way.127 Declining to
measure the school’s response against the complete pattern of
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id. Although the school asserted as a defense that S.C. consented to these assaults, the school principal acknowledged that S.C. lacked capacity to consent because
his disability left S.C. unable to distinguish right from wrong in the context of sexual
activity. See Plaintiff’s Memoranda of Law Regarding Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act, Porto v. Town of Tewksbury, No. 04-CV10003, 2005 WL 3173614 (W.D.
Mass. Oct. 11, 2005).
120. Porto, 488 F.3d at 71.
121. Id. at 76.
122. Id. at 73–74.
123. Id. at 73.
124. Id. at 73–74.
125. Id. at 71.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 73–74.
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harassment, the court did not consider whether the school should
have attempted alternative interventions to at least try to better address the harassment.128 By not making such an evaluation, the court
effectively reduced the assessment of deliberate indifference to a matter of merely counting whether any response occurred.129 With such
reductive evaluations, the First Circuit, along with other courts, finds
schools’ repeated use of failed responses to student sexual harassment not deliberately indifferent.130
C. SCHOOLS’ INVERTED RESPONSES TO STUDENT SEXUAL HARASSMENT THAT
BLAME AND PUNISH SURVIVORS
Finally, courts have also considered schools’ inverted responses
to student sexual harassment.131 Instead of being designed to address
the behavior of the wrongdoer, this response type blames and punishes the survivors.132 In evaluating these responses to student sexual

128. See id.
129. See id.
130. In McCoy v. Board of Education, the Sixth Circuit considered whether a school’s
repeated use of reprimands—both verbal and written—in response to multiple reports that teacher Gary Stroup had inappropriately touched elementary school students demonstrated deliberate indifference. 515 F. App’x 387, 389 (6th Cir. 2013).
When the school received a written report from a student that Stroup had molested
him, the principal discussed the matter with Stroup, just as she had done in response
to previous reports of his inappropriate touching of students, but she did nothing else.
Id. When Stroup then molested John Doe, who brought a Title IX claim based on his
assault, however, the court did not grapple with, and instead ignored, evidence of the
school’s prior use of failed responses to address Stroup’s abuse. Id. at 391. The court
said that because the school had knowledge of only “several instances of physical contact that were ostensibly non-sexual but could have served as potential indicia for sexual malfeasance,” its letters and verbal admonishments satisfied the deliberate indifference standard. Id. at 392. The court did not explain, though, how a student’s letter
saying that Stroup had touched him in his “‘public’ areas” did not require more of a
response under this rationale. Id. at 389. By disregarding this evidence, the court failed
to engage in any substantive assessment of the school’s responses, including a determination of whether the school’s repetition of those failed responses was clearly unreasonable and therefore deliberately indifferent. See id. It therefore, like the First Circuit in Porto v. Town of Tewksbury, 488 F.3d 67 (1st Cir. 2007), turned the evaluation
of deliberate indifference into a matter of simply counting whether a response occurred. The McCoy court consequently concluded that because the school had responded in some way to Stroup’s prior abuse, it did not act with deliberate indifference
and so was not responsible for the assault John Doe suffered. See McCoy, 515 F. App’x
at 392.
131. See infra notes 135, 139 and accompanying text.
132. See infra notes 135, 139 and accompanying text.
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harassment, the courts regularly find they do not establish deliberate
indifference.133
Saying that the courts evaluate schools’ survivor-blaming responses, though, arguably overstates the matter.134 More accurately,
they use those survivor-blaming responses to justify their conclusions
that schools did not act with deliberate indifference.135 For example,
in K.S. v. Northwest Independent School District, after middle school
student K.S. suffered repeated instances of harassment by his peers,
he finally physically pushed back one day when “three students verbally harassed and pushed” him in the hallway.136 Assessing K.S.’s Title IX claim, the court concluded that the school’s punishment of K.S.
did not demonstrate deliberate indifference because K.S.’s suspension
resulted from “his own misconduct.”137 Disregarding the harassment
by others that prompted K.S.’s actions and instead blaming K.S. for his
own self-defensive response, the court justified its finding that the
school’s response to his sexual harassment was not deliberately indifferent.138
Schools not only blame survivors of sexual harassment, but they
also punish them for it.139 In K.F. v. Monroe Woodbury Central School
133. See infra notes 135, 139 and accompanying text.
134. See infra notes 135, 139 and accompanying text.
135. When the Sixth Circuit assessed middle school student D.S.’s Title IX claim in
Stiles v. Grainger County, the court not only found the school’s occasional non-responses not deliberately indifferent, but it also found its punishment and blame of D.S.
not deliberately indifferent. 819 F.3d 834, 852–53 (6th Cir. 2016). The court described
how in the middle of the two school years of harassment endured, a police official
working with the school on the harassment “blam[ed] D.S. for the incidents, stating
that D.S. could defend himself, and recommending that D.S. learn martial arts.” Id. at
843. The official also minimized D.S.’s harassment, “warn[ing] D.S. not to . . . report
[other students] for trivial teasing.” Id. Although this response both focused on D.S. and
failed to address the perpetrators of the harassment, the court minimized these problems. See id. It acknowledged that the school “made rude or critical comments [and]
offered unhelpful suggestions,” but it then concluded that such responses were irrelevant and not clearly unreasonable. Id. at 849. It snidely explained that the deliberate
indifference standard “does not require that [a defendant] . . . have a pleasant demeanor.” Id. at 853 (alterations in original) (quoting Williams v. Port Huron Sch. Dist.,
455 F. App’x 612, 620 (6th Cir. 2012)).
136. 689 F. App’x 780, 782 (5th Cir. 2017).
137. Id. at 785.
138. Id.
139. In Rost ex rel. K.C. v. Steamboat Springs RE-2 School District, the school resource officer questioned K.C., a student with a brain injury, at the request of the school
about K.C.’s report of sexual harassment. 511 F.3d 1114, 1117 (10th Cir. 2008). The
questioning lasted between one to two hours. Id. at 1118. The length of that questioning, particularly coupled with the nature of K.C.’s disability, arguably operates as a
form of punishment. See infra Parts II.B.1–2. Nevertheless, without specifically

2278

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[105:2259

District, for instance, middle school student C.F. suffered “intense and
prolonged teasing—indeed ‘bullying’—and on two occasions was sexually assaulted” by other students.140 In response, the school offered
to send C.F. to an out-of-district program for “students with serious
disciplinary records.”141 In other words, the school proposed to send
C.F. to a disciplinary school placement, effectively punishing her for
the sexual harassment and assaults she suffered.142 Yet, because the
school offered “alternatives to CF attending high school,” the court
found that the school did not act with deliberate indifference.143 Ignoring that these types of interventions amount to a form of punishment, courts, like the Fifth Circuit in K.F., permit schools to punish students in response to sexual harassment without transgressing the
deliberate indifference standard.144
D. TITLE IX’S LOSS OF PURPOSE AND EFFECT
When schools fail to respond even intermittently to student sexual harassment, repeat failed responses to it, or punish and blame the
survivors, they do the opposite of fulfilling Title IX’s purpose of protecting students. 145 Instead, these three types of responses put students at risk for further sexual harassment such that they lose educational benefits even when the risk does not culminate in further
harassment.146 In addition, these responses indirectly cause students

addressing this interview, the court insisted that nothing the school did in response to
K.C.’s harassment rose to the level of deliberate indifference. Rost, 511 F.3d at 1123–
24. In Doe v. Board of Education, in response to some of the sexual harassment and
abuse that fourth grade student J.D. endured by student M.O., the school provided J.D.
with a bathroom escort. 605 F. App’x 159, 163 (4th Cir. 2015). The bathroom escort,
though, caused students to make “‘horrible jokes’ about [J.D.’s] use of the escort.” Id.
Effectively, then, the school implemented a form of punishment in response to J.D.’s
harassment and abuse because the intervention resulted in further suffering for J.D.,
but the court found the school did not act with deliberate indifference. See id. Similarly,
in Doe v. Dallas Independent School District, the school responded to the report that
teacher John McGrew molested third grade student J.H. by meting out a kind of punishment to J.H. when it interrogated him in the presence of McGrew, including by asking him to “repeat his accusation to McGrew.” 220 F.3d 380, 387 (5th Cir. 2000). The
court, though, did not find these responses deliberately indifferent. Id.
140. 531 F. App’x 132, 133 (2d Cir. 2013).
141. Id.
142. See id.
143. Id. at 134.
144. See infra Part I.D.1.
145. See Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677 (1979); supra note 60 and accompanying text.
146. See infra Part I.D.1.
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to actually suffer more sexual harassment. 147 Further, schools’ inverted responses directly cause students to suffer secondary trauma
and institutional betrayals.148 Far from holding schools to account for
failing to fulfill Title IX’s purpose of protecting students from sexual
harassment, the courts thus permit schools to act as enablers of student sexual harassment.149 They transform the deliberate indifference
standard into a vehicle for allowing schools to respond in ways that
cause students more harm.
1. Allowing Schools To Put Students at Risk for Additional Sexual
Harassment
When schools intermittently respond to student sexual harassment with inaction, repeat failed or otherwise inadequate responses
to it, and blame and punish survivors, they put students at risk of suffering further sexual harassment. They do so by signaling that the harassment can continue because the schools will not act to end it.150 By
intermittently not responding to student harassment, schools do little
or nothing to stop it and therefore risk its recurrence.151 By repeatedly
implementing failed responses to sexual harassment, the schools also
do little more than nothing to end it and so put students at risk of its
recurrence.152 By punishing and blaming the survivors of sexual harassment and assault, schools focus their behavioral concerns on the
survivor and not the perpetrator.153 They therefore send the message
that the perpetrator’s behavior is not the problem and so can continue.154
When schools put students at risk of further sexual harassment
in these ways, it does not, of course, mean that they will suffer more
sexual harassment. 155 That schools fail to protect against this risk,
though, means that students are left to the mercy of the perpetrator
or sheer luck to avoid it. Even if students only suffer the risk of further
sexual harassment but no more actual harassment, the risk can result
in their loss of educational benefits at school, not to mention likely
147. See infra Part I.D.2.
148. See infra Part I.D.3.
149. See infra Parts I.D.1–3.
150. See supra Part I.A.
151. See supra Part I.A.
152. See supra Part I.B.
153. See supra Part I.C.
154. See supra Part I.C.
155. See Rost ex rel. K.C. v. Steamboat Springs RE-2 Sch. Dist., 511 F.3d 1114, 1117
(10th Cir. 2008); infra notes 157, 164 and accompanying text.
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generalized trauma, fear, and the possibility of negative mental health
consequences. 156 Such was the case in Rost ex rel. K.C. v. Steamboat
Springs RE-2 School District, where the Tenth Circuit denied the claim
of middle school student K.C., a student with a brain injury, who was
repeatedly sexually harassed and assaulted by fellow students. 157
Among other things, the other students called her names, “continuously pestered her for oral sex,” and “threatened to distribute naked
photographs of her.” 158 In response, the school did nothing in the
school setting to address the harassment.159 It only turned the investigation over to law enforcement, which declined to prosecute the
boys who harassed K.C., in part out of concern for the toll it would take
on K.C.160 Even then, though, the school still did nothing at all to address the effects of K.C.’s harassment or the behavior of the boys who
harassed and assaulted her.161
The school’s failure to do anything to address the harassment in
the school setting put K.C. at risk of suffering further sexual harassment.162 Its lack of a response to the harassment in school signaled
that such harassment could continue unabated by the school.163 Precisely because of this risk, K.C. refused to return to school and so for
that reason did not suffer any further sexual harassment.164 She did,
though, consequently suffer the loss of educational benefits at
school.165 Evidence showed
that the school’s non-response to the boys’ sexual harassment is what kept
[K.C. from returning to school]. K.C.’s psychiatrist advised [K.C.’s mother] Ms.
Rost that it was important “to help [K.C.] find a safer environment, especially
considering that if she goes back to the exact same high school, she will be
around [the boys].”166
156. See Rost, 511 F.3d at 1117 (noting that one survivor feared to attend class due
to sexual harassment); Davis ex rel. LaShonda D. v. Monroe Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S.
629, 634 (1999) (noting a survivor’s drop in grades due to sexual harassment); infra
notes 157, 164 and accompanying text.
157. 511 F.3d at 1117.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. See infra note 164 and accompanying text.
163. See infra note 164 and accompanying text.
164. 511 F.3d at 1117. When asked why she had refused to send K.C. back to school,
Ms. Rost testified that she was relying on the psychiatrist’s recommendation not to
return. Id. at 1131 (McConnell, J., concurring in part).
165. Id. at 1117 (majority opinion).
166. Id. at 1131 (McConnell, J., concurring in part). Although K.C. ultimately moved
out of state with her family, “[t]he record suggests that it was the undeterred presence
of the boys that kept K.C. from returning to school.” Id.
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Yet, even though the school put K.C. at such risk and K.C. consequently
lost the benefit of her education, the Tenth Circuit found the school
had not acted with deliberate indifference.167
2. Allowing Schools To Indirectly Cause Students To Suffer
Additional Sexual Harassment
Schools do not just put students at risk for sexual harassment
with these vapid responses to student sexual harassment; they also
indirectly cause students to actually suffer additional sexual harassment. When schools only occasionally respond or repeat failed responses to student sexual harassment, they indirectly cause students
to suffer further harassment by effectively allowing it to continue unhindered by the school.168 The result is that students then do suffer
more, sometimes escalating, sexual harassment.169 First, they suffer
additional harassment by their original perpetrators.170 Second, they
suffer harassment by others.171 The harassment can go on for months
and even years.172 Once it goes on without any or any adequate response from the schools, the harassment also intensifies in severity.173
Given that schools’ non-responses and repeated use of failed responses can give the perpetrator a veritable green light to continue

167. Id. at 1117 (majority opinion).
168. See supra Part I.A.
169. See supra notes 90, 92, 98, 100, 102 and accompanying text.
170. See, e.g., Gabrielle M. v. Park Forest-Chi. Heights Sch. Dist. 163, 315 F.3d 817,
818–21 (7th Cir. 2003); supra note 104 and accompanying text; Porto v. Town of
Tewksbury, 488 F.3d 67, 70 (1st Cir. 2007); supra note 111 and accompanying text;
Doe v. Bd. of Educ., 605 F. App’x 159, 161–62 (4th Cir. 2015); supra note 92 and accompanying text.
171. See, e.g., K.S. v. Nw. Indep. Sch. Dist., 689 F. App’x 780, 781–83 (5th Cir. 2017);
Stiles ex rel. D.S. v. Grainger Cnty., 819 F.3d 834, 840–45 (6th Cir. 2016); infra note 174
and accompanying text. Such unchecked harassment can, for example, inspire other
students to join the harassment or more generally permit a climate where harassment
is tolerated and so occurs more often and more severely. See infra note 174 and accompanying text.
172. In McCoy v. Board of Education, for example, teacher Gary Stroup molested
multiple students over a period of six years. 515 F. App’x 387, 389 (6th Cir. 2013). In
Porto v. Town of Tewksbury, student R.C. repeatedly harassed and assaulted student
S.C. for approximately six years. 488 F.3d at 70–71.
173. For example, in Doe v. Board of Education, student J.D. suffered three years of
sexual harassment by M.O. 605 F. App’x at 162–63. The school’s failures to respond or
poorly designed responses left J.D. exposed to more assault that culminated in a sexual
assault in the bathroom. Id. In Porto v. Town of Tewksbury, S.C.’s years of harassing R.C.
led to both an assault on the bus and later in the school bathroom. 488 F.3d at 70–71.
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the harassment, these outcomes seem not just likely but almost inevitable.174
For example, in McCoy v. Board of Education, when the Columbus
City Schools learned that Gary Stroup had inappropriately touched elementary school students, a school district official warned Stroup by
letter not to touch students in those ways even though a prior such
letter had not stopped that same behavior. 175 Then, when principal
Dora Kunz later received a letter from a student stating that teacher
Gary Stroup had touched his “public” areas, Kunz left her position
without informing her successor, Theresa Tracy, of the problems.176
With nothing but these minimal responses to constrain him, Stroup
unsurprisingly went on to molest student John Doe.177
It was not the school’s first letter to Stroup, as weak a response
as it arguably was, that indirectly caused Stroup’s later sexual abuse
of John Doe.178 By continuing to use that same response even though
it had not stopped Stroup’s behavior, though, the school effectively allowed Stroup’s behavior to continue and so indirectly caused it. 179
Knowingly implementing a response that does not work to address
sexual harassment does little, if anything, more to stop it than does a
total failure to respond at all.180 It essentially allows the harassment
to happen again.181 Similarly, because Principal Kunz did not inform
Principal Tracy of the problems with Stroup, this non-response to
174. See supra note 173 and accompanying text. In Stiles, when middle school student D.S. suffered three years of repeated harassment by at least eleven different students over the course of those years, and the school did nothing in response, predictably, those failures did not stem the tide of harassment, and D.S. continued to suffer
harassment by other students. 819 F.3d at 841–45. The school’s failures to respond at
times, therefore, not only exposed D.S. to this additional harassment, but it paved the
way, or indirectly caused, the pervasive harassment he then did suffer. Id. In K.S. v.
Northwest Independent School District, by not always disciplining students who harassed sixth grade student K.S., the school sent the message that such behavior could
continue without certain repercussion, and it did continue. 689 F. App’x at 781. The
harassment began with name-calling and escalated to slapping and pushing, sometimes by multiple students at one time. Id. at 781–82. Similarly, kindergartener Gabrielle M.’s elementary school effectively allowed student Jason to continue harassing Gabrielle M. by its decision to separate the children but then only actually separating
them sometimes. Gabrielle M., 315 F.3d at 819–20. Allowed access to Gabrielle in this
way, Jason could and did continue to sexually assault her. Id. at 820.
175. McCoy, 515 F. App’x at 389.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id.; see infra note 370 and accompanying text.
179. See McCoy, 515 F. App’x at 389.
180. See infra note 348 and accompanying text.
181. See infra note 348 and accompanying text.
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Stroup’s assaults left Tracy unable to address or prevent them. 182
Kunz’s failure to apprise Tracy of Stroup’s abusive behavior permitted
Stroup to continue that behavior without even the potential to be
checked by Tracy or anyone else.183 Kunz’s failure, therefore, also indirectly caused John Doe’s assault.184 The McCoy court, however, sanctioned the school’s actions that indirectly caused John Doe’s harm by
finding the school’s responses to Stroup’s reported abuse to be not deliberately indifferent.185 It thus allowed the school to indirectly cause
Doe’s further sexual harassment.186
3. Allowing Schools To Directly Cause Students To Suffer Secondary
Harms and Institutional Betrayals
By allowing schools’ inverted responses to sexual harassment,
the courts also permit the public schools to work additional, more direct harms on students.187 First, students suffer secondary traumas as
a direct result of schools’ responses to their sexual harassment.188 Secondary trauma, also called “second assault” or “second victimization,”
refers to the “[n]egative responses to disclosure” of sexual harassment
and abuse, including responses that “blame, stigmatize, [and] attempt
to . . . distract the victim from discussing the assault.” 189 This

182. McCoy, 515 F. App’x at 389.
183. Id. at 389, 391–92.
184. Id.; see infra note 224 and accompanying text.
185. McCoy, 515 F. App’x at 391–92. Other courts also fail to find that schools’ repeated use of failed responses to student sexual harassment has caused students to
suffer more sexual harassment by permitting it to recur. For example, in Doe v. Board
of Education, when student J.D.’s elementary school tried more than once to address
his sexual harassment and abuse by student M.O. by simply talking to M.O., and that
repeated use of a failed intervention did not stop the harassment, and so amounted to
almost no response at all, the school nevertheless continued to use that intervention.
605 F. App’x 159, 161–62 (4th Cir. 2015). It therefore subjected J.D. to further sexual
harassment and the sexual assault that he suffered by the school’s use of that failed
intervention. See id.; supra note 92 and accompanying text.
186. See McCoy, 515 F. App’x at 391–92.
187. See infra notes 197, 200–01 and accompanying text.
188. See infra notes 197, 200–01 and accompanying text; Orchowski & Gidycz, supra note 39, at 266; see also Maier, supra note 39, at 289 (“[‘Secondary traumas’ or
‘revictimization’] refers to the blame and stigmatizing responses to victims by the
criminal justice, legal, and medical systems, as well as friends and family. It also refers
to the trauma, distress, and alienation that victims may experience after the assault as
a result of [those] responses.”).
189. Orchowski & Gidycz, supra note 39, at 266.
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secondary trauma can be more acute than the trauma that results
from the original harassment or assault.190
Second, students suffer institutional betrayals when schools punish and blame them for their sexual harassment.191 Institutional betrayals happen “when an institution causes harm to an individual who
trusts or depends upon that institution.”192 They can “occur via omission of protective, preventative, or responsive institutional actions.”193 More precisely, they happen when an institution blames or
does not believe the report of a person who has suffered a sexual assault or harassment.194 They also occur when institutions “pressure
[victims] to recount the events multiple times to multiple people, [fail]
to give them adequate information, or [refuse] to help.”195
190. See Maier, supra note 39; Barbara Ryan, Cynthia Bashant & Deena Brooks,
Protecting and Supporting Children in the Child Welfare System and the Juvenile Court,
57 JUV. & FAM. CT. J. (SPECIAL ISSUE) 61, 62 (2006) (noting that in the child welfare and
juvenile courts, children “can be exposed to additional stressful, frightening, and emotionally overwhelming experiences, resulting in additional layers of trauma”); NAT’L
CRIME VICTIM L. INST., POLYVICTIMS: VICTIMS’ RIGHTS ENFORCEMENT AS A TOOL TO MITIGATE
“SECONDARY VICTIMIZATION” IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 1 (2013), http://www.ncdsv
.org/images/NCVLI_PolyvictimsVictimsRightsEnforcementAsATool_3-2013.pdf
[https://perma.cc/VV59-TVGQ]. Studies show that children, like adults, experience
these traumas. See Gail S. Goodman, Elizabeth Pyle Taub, David P.H. Jones, Patricia England, Linda K. Port, Leslie Rudy & Lydia Prado, Testifying in Criminal Court: Emotional
Effects on Child Sexual Assault Victims, 57 MONOGRAPHS SOC’Y FOR RSCH. CHILD DEV. 1,
119–20 (1992).
191. Smith & Freyd, supra note 39, at 578.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 579.
194. NAT’L CRIME VICTIM L. INST., supra note 190; Rebecca Campbell & Sheela Raja,
The Sexual Assault and Secondary Victimization of Female Veterans: Help-Seeking Experiences with Military and Civilian Social Systems, 29 PSYCH. WOMEN Q. 97, 97 (2005)
(“[V]ictim-blaming attitudes, behaviors, and practices . . . [result] in additional trauma
for sexual assault survivors.”); Maier, supra note 39, at 291; see also SHRIVER CTR.,
ENSURING SUCCESS IN SCHOOL, SUPPORTING SURVIVORS 1, 20 (2018), https://news.wttw
.com/sites/default/files/article/file-attachments/Shriver%20report_draft%204%
20(1).pdf [https://perma.cc/PR32-2FNT] (“Participants also reported feeling revictimized when school officials place the blame for the violence on the survivor.”).
195. Maier, supra note 39, at 297. Such harms occur in children and adults. Studies
show that when children who suffer sexual trauma then have to testify repeatedly in
court and confront their abuser, they experience emotional distress. See Goodman et
al., supra note 190; Ryan et al., supra note 190. The Supreme Court has also noted the
impact of this kind of trauma. Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 852, 857 (1999) (noting
that the Court “ha[s] of course recognized that a State’s interest in ‘the protection of
minor victims of sex crimes from further trauma and embarrassment’ is a ‘compelling’
one” and acknowledging the possibility that for the child “trauma . . . [could] be caused
by testifying in the physical presence of the defendant” (citations omitted)); CASEY FAM.
PROGRAMS, WHY SHOULD CHILD PROTECTION AGENCIES BECOME TRAUMA-INFORMED? 1, 2
(2018), https://caseyfamilypro-wpengine.netdna-ssl.com/media/SComm_Trauma
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Schools directly impose secondary traumas and cause students
to suffer institutional betrayal when they respond in inverted ways to
reports of student sexual harassment. 196 When schools blame and
punish the students who have suffered sexual harassment and assault
or force them to recount their experiences in front of the perpetrators,
the students, predictably, endure more trauma.197 They suffer depression, anxiety, and even suicide attempts.198 Middle school student K.S.,
whose Title IX claim was rejected by the Fifth Circuit, experienced
these traumas.199 When K.S.’s school punished him because he fought
back after enduring multiple instances of harassment, K.S. poignantly
stated that the school’s response made him feel that “nothing ever
happened” as a result of his report and “like nobody cared about
him.”200 This institutional betrayal and K.S.’s secondary trauma contributed to his suicide attempt.201
-informed-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/2392-24DT] (advocating for trauma-informed
child welfare practices because “the system’s interactions with children and families
might inadvertently make them feel unsafe, either physically or emotionally”).
196. The courts’ interpretations not only permit schools to directly and indirectly
cause student sexual harassment and related trauma, but they also arguably incentivize it. See MacKinnon, supra note 17.
197. See, e.g., Doe ex rel. Doe v. Dall. Indep. Sch. Dist., 220 F.3d 380, 388 (5th Cir.
2000) (describing when elementary school student J.H. reported his sexual assault by
teacher John McGrew, the school made J.H. recount his accusations in person to
McGrew, thereby forcing him to relive the trauma by telling the perpetrator); Doe v.
Bd. of Educ., 605 F. App’x 159, 163 (4th Cir. 2015) (describing when a middle school
student suffered repeated sexual harassment and assault by student M.O., the school
effectively punished him by requiring that he have another student escort him to the
bathroom, which caused him further trauma because “other students ‘made horrible
jokes’ about his use of the escort” and had “resultant stomach pains” (citations omitted)); Appellant’s Brief in Chief at 8, KF ex rel. CF v. Monroe Woodbury Cent. Sch. Dist.,
551 F. App’x 132 (2d Cir. 2013) (No. 13-516-CV), 2013 WL 1621950 (describing that
in response to K.F.’s two years of sexual harassment and assault, the school offered to
send K.F. to a disciplinary placement, and although she attended for a short period of
time, she was “uncomfortable . . . and did not remain there”).
198. See infra notes 200–01 and accompanying text.
199. Stiles ex rel. D.S. v. Grainger Cnty., 819 F.3d 834 (6th Cir. 2016).
200. Appellant’s Brief on the Merits, K.S. v. Nw. Indep. Sch. Dist., 689 F. App’x 780
(5th Cir. 2016) (No. 16-40093), 2016 WL 1715073, at *8 (internal quotation marks
omitted). When students of color face such responses, their trauma can be compounded still further. See Sumi K. Cho, Converging Stereotypes in Racialized Sexual Harassment: Where the Model Minority Meets Suzie Wong, 1 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 177, 181
(1997) (arguing that the convergence of racial and gender stereotypes of Asian Pacific
American women constitutes a racialized sexual harassment and that kind of intersectional sexual harassment exacerbates the harm of the harassment).
201. K.S.’s brief on appeal stated:
[I]t was the feeling that there was nobody there to help, that people felt he
was the cause of the problems he was experiencing, that finally caused him

2286

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[105:2259

Further, to get any potential help from a school following sexual
harassment or assault, the courts effectively require students to subject themselves to these secondary traumas and institutional betrayals.202 Because the actual notice standard under the Supreme Court’s
Title IX test relieves schools of any obligation to respond to sexual harassment if they do not have very specific notice of it, students must
report their sexual harassment to have any hope of getting help for or
redress from it.203 However, when schools then do respond, the lower
courts permit schools’ inverted responses that cause secondary traumas and institutional betrayals. 204 Under the lower courts’ assessments, therefore, these two prongs of the Title IX standard work together to essentially require students to subject themselves to these
harms.205
Courts thus not only allow K–12 public schools to intermittently
fail to respond to student sexual harassment, repeat failed responses
to it, and punish and blame the survivors of it, but by doing so, they
also allow schools to harm students. By not finding these types of responses by schools deliberately indifferent, the courts allow schools
to put students at risk for and indirectly cause them further sexual
harassment. They also permit schools to wreak additional harms in
the form of secondary traumas and institutional betrayals. Instead of

to overdose and attempt suicide because [school administrators] said that he
was the cause of all the problems he was experiencing and had been nothing
but trouble.
Appellant’s Brief on the Merits, supra note 200. Similarly, in Stiles v. Grainger, middle
school student D.S. endured extensive bullying over three years, and the school blamed
him. D.S. could not comprehend the school’s failure to help him, stating, “This attempt
to turn the tables on D.S. upset and frustrated him; ‘I was too little to be a bully. It
wasn’t fair of him to do that.’” Brief of Appellant at 12, Stiles ex rel. D.S. v. Grainger
Cnty., 819 F.3d 834 (6th Cir. 2015) (No. 15-5438), 2015 WL 4910738. He further stated
that when he reported to a school principal “[i]t seemed like she didn’t care about what
happened and just wanted me out of her office.” Id. at 27.
202. Because, as the Supreme Court said in Davis that a school need only act to
meet the deliberate indifference standard if the sexual harassment is actually known
to the school, if the school does not have that requisite degree of notice, the school need
not do anything at all. Davis v. Monroe Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 641, 643, 645,
647 (1999).
203. See supra note 202 and accompanying text; see also Suski, supra note 47 (explaining how the courts’ assessments of the actual notice requirement under Title IX
demands that students not only report but report with particularity their sexual harassment and assault).
204. See supra notes 197, 200–01 and accompanying text.
205. See supra notes 197, 200–01 and accompanying text.
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interpreting Title IX in concert with its protective purpose, then, the
courts’ assessments of the statute gut its purpose.206
II. THE TITLE IX SUBVERSION
On first consideration, Title IX’s loss of purpose and K–12 students’ lack of protection from sexual harassment in school might seem
as inevitable as it is tragic. If the courts were simply applying with fidelity a vacuous standard, then that would be true. Instead, this loss
of purpose and protection is far from the inescapable result of the necessary application of the deliberate indifference standard.207
The deliberate indifference standard, as articulated by the Supreme Court, has far more potential to achieve the law’s protective
purpose than the lower courts’ assessments suggest.208 When the Supreme Court found that Title IX prohibits peer sexual harassment in
Davis v. Monroe County Board of Education, it explained the deliberate
indifference standard as proscribing more than total and complete indifference in the general sense of the word.209 Consistent with the Title IX’s protective purpose, the Court described the standard as precluding schools’ responses to known sexual harassment that
indirectly cause or put students at risk for further such harassment.210
The deliberate indifference standard can, therefore, hold schools to
account for their intermittent failures to respond to student sexual
harassment, their repeated use of failed responses to it, and their responses that punish and blame survivors because all such responses
put students at risk for and indirectly cause their sexual harassment.211
Yet, in evaluating these responses by K–12 public schools for deliberate indifference, the lower courts regularly fail to make such assessments.212 Instead, they evaluate deliberate indifference based on
the Supreme Court’s additional guidance in Davis that schools need to
respond to student sexual harassment in a “not clearly unreasonable”
way.213 Rather than reading this guidance in the full context in which
the Court offered it, however, the lower courts take this language entirely out of context and apply it as they independently conceive of
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.

See Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 704 (1979).
See infra Part II.A.
See infra Part II.A.
See infra note 293 and accompanying text.
See Davis v. Monroe Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 645 (1999).
See infra Parts II.A–B.
See infra Part II.B.
Davis, 526 U.S. at 649.
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it.214 They thus avoid any determination of why K–12 public school
students continue to suffer sexual harassment and whether the
school’s response risked or caused it.215 They consequently void the
deliberate indifference standard’s complete meaning and conclude
that any response by the K–12 public schools other than none at all
satisfies Title IX.216 The courts thus subvert Title IX. The ramifications
of the courts’ evaluations have particular significance for K–12 public
school students because they already have fewer structural protections from sexual harassment than college and university students.217
This Title IX subversion is, therefore, a matter of particular urgency.218
A. WHAT THE DELIBERATE INDIFFERENCE STANDARD CAN REQUIRE OF THE
PUBLIC SCHOOLS
Although the public schools rarely operate under any obligation
to affirmatively protect students, Title IX’s deliberate indifference
standard can require such protections from sexual harassment and assault, at least once schools know some harassment has occurred.219
214. See infra Part II.B.2.
215. See infra Part II.B.2.
216. See infra Part II.B.
217. See infra notes 300–02, 304, 306 and accompanying text.
218. See infra Part II.C.
219. Tort law does call for schools to provide some degree of protection because it
imposes a duty of care in some circumstances, but those duties are significantly undercut by, among other things, broad-reaching immunities available to the public schools.
DAN B. DOBBS, PAUL T. HAYDEN & ELLEN M. BUBLICK, THE LAW OF TORTS § 259 (2d ed. 2011)
(“The general duty of care defendants owe to strangers is the duty to use reasonable
care in the defendant’s active conduct. However, the defendant who does nothing at all
often owes no duty of care to strangers. This means, for example, that he need not
throw a rope to a drowning person, even if reasonable care would require such an action . . . . [But because of the special relationship doctrine] a high school has a special
relationship with its students, at least in connection with school, so it would be under
a duty of reasonable care to take positive steps to save a student drowning at a school
event.”). Even though tort law does offer this potential for individual redress for students who have suffered sexual harassment in school, schools can avoid liability by
claiming immunity. JAMES A. RAPP, 5 EDUCATION LAW § 12.07 (2020). Even without immunity, schools can defend themselves using numerous, generous other defenses. Id.
§ 12.14(5). For example, negligent supervision claims for failing to properly protect
students require “standards of knowledge [that] are significant and . . . a foreseeable
risk of harm.” Id. § 12.14(5)(b)(iii). Public schools, therefore, successfully avoid responsibility in tort-based claims on that lack of foreseeability. See, e.g., Conklin v. Saugerties Cent. Sch. Dist., 966 N.Y.S.2d 575 (App. Div. 2013) (finding that a school could
not foresee that one student would assault another student even though the school
knew the assaulting student had threatened to have the fight). Even when students
have been shot or stabbed and schools have warnings that the fights might occur, they
still successfully use the lack of foreseeability to evade liability in tort. RAPP, supra,
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Explaining the standard, the Supreme Court said that schools are deliberately indifferent when they either “at a minimum, ‘cause [students] to undergo’ harassment or ‘make them liable or vulnerable’ to
it.”220 The standard, therefore, can demand that schools act affirmatively to protect against indirectly causing or even merely putting students at risk for sexual harassment.221
That said, since schools need not act at all in response to sexual
harassment until they have actual notice that some has occurred,
§ 12.12(2)(b). The same holds true for other sorts of tort claims, such as those brought
on theories of vicarious liability, including respondeat superior claims. See, e.g., John
Doe 1 v. Bd. of Educ., 955 N.Y.S.2d 600, 602 (App. Div. 2012) (finding the public school
not liable in tort when a teacher’s aide engaged in a sexual relationship with a student
because, among other things, the activity was outside the scope of employment). But
see Booth v. Orleans Par. Sch. Bd., 49 So. 3d 919 (La. Ct. App. 2010) (concluding that
when a janitor assaulted a student, the school board could be held liable in tort). Student claims based on the duty of care in tort, therefore, often fail. See, e.g., Daniel B.
Weddle, Bullying in Schools: The Disconnect Between Empirical Research and Constitutional, Statutory, and Tort Duties to Supervise, 77 TEMP. L. REV. 641 (2004) (analyzing
the ways that tort serves as a limited recourse and means of redress for bullying); see
also Mark C. Weber, Disability Harassment in the Public Schools, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV.
1079, 1145–47 (2002) (describing how state immunity doctrines limit or preclude disability harassment claims by students).
220. Davis v. Monroe Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 645 (1999) (citations omitted). With the adoption of this standard the court rejected alternative vicarious liability theories. Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 290–91 (1998); Davis,
526 U.S. at 641. Instead, the Court sought to hold schools liable under Title IX for their
own actions in response to student sexual harassment. Gebser, 524 U.S. at 291; Davis,
526 U.S. at 641 (“We disagree with respondents’ assertion, however, that petitioner
seeks to hold the Board liable for G.F.’s actions instead of its own. Here, petitioner attempts to hold the board liable for its own decision to remain idle in the face of known
student-on-student harassment in its schools.”). To that end, in Gebser, the Court
quoted its § 1983 police liability cases, including Board of Commissioners v. Brown,
when settling on the deliberate indifference standard for determining such liability.
Gebser, 524 U.S. at 291. In doing so, it said that “[c]omparable considerations [to those
in the Title IX context] led to our adoption of a deliberate indifference standard for
claims under § 1983.” Id. In those § 1983 police cases, the standard seeks to hold municipalities liable for their “actions in failing to prevent a deprivation of federal rights.”
Id.
221. See infra notes 224, 232 and accompanying text. With this standard, the Court
sets Title IX liability apart from other forms of intentional discrimination in that the
deliberate indifference standard does not require scrutiny of a school’s subjective intent to discriminate in evaluating its response to sexual harassment. See Brake, supra
note 73, at 18 (noting the deliberate indifference standard in Title IX claims is not
about “a specific state of mind or an intent to violate the rights of others”); Derek W.
Black, The Mysteriously Reappearing Cause of Action: The Court’s Expanded Concept of
Intentional Gender and Race Discrimination in Federally Funded Programs, 67 MD. L.
REV. 358, 380 (2008) (arguing that Title IX jurisprudence does not abandon intentionality as a requirement but arguing the concept is expanded so that “intent can be established with evidence short of race or gender motivation on the part of the [school]”).
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schools can only indirectly cause or directly put students at risk for
recurrent harassment.222 Once they have that actual notice, though, if
the public schools’ responses indirectly cause or directly put students
at risk for further sexual harassment, then courts can find that those
responses demonstrate deliberate indifference.223
The Supreme Court was explicit on the point that Title IX holds
schools to account for indirectly causing students’ sexual harassment.224 It explained that schools would be held liable for causing sexual harassment even though schools “[do] not engage in the harassment directly.” 225 This limitation on the causal component of
deliberate indifference is the natural result of the Court’s formulation
of the actual notice prong of its actual notice-deliberate indifference
test for Title IX claims.226 In describing actual notice, the Court said
that even if a teacher or other school staff member directly causes the
harassment, the knowledge of the wrongdoer does not establish actual notice.227 Not only, then, does some school staff member need actual notice of the sexual harassment to trigger any obligation on the
part of the school to act at all, let alone without deliberate indifference,

222. Gebser, 524 U.S. at 290; Davis, 526 U.S. at 643. The actual notice requirement
itself operates as a significant limitation on the protections of Title IX. See supra note
47 and accompanying text.
223. See supra notes 220, 222 and accompanying text; Davis, 526 U.S. at 643–44.
224. See Davis, 526 U.S. at 644–45; see also Brake, supra note 73, at 11 (“[The Davis
Court’s] conclusion that the school’s response ‘causes’ the discriminatory harm finds
substantial support in the reality of peer sexual harassment. When a school reacts indifferently to sexual harassment by students, despite notice of the harassment, the
school ‘effectively causes’ the discrimination in two ways: (1) it intensifies the harm
inflicted on harassment victims and (2) increases the likelihood that the frequency and
severity of the harassment will escalate.” (citations omitted)); Black, supra note 221.
225. Davis, 526 U.S. at 644. Under the actual notice prong, the notice of sexual harassment must be received by a person with “authority to address the alleged discrimination.” Gebser, 524 U.S. at 290.
226. See Gebser, 524 U.S. at 291. The Court effectively abandoned any school liability under Title IX based on direct causation when it rejected the notion that the actions
of the wrongdoer, even if a school employee, sufficed to supply actual notice under
Title IX. See id.; supra note 225 and accompanying text.
227. The Court said, “[T]he knowledge of the wrongdoer himself is not pertinent
to the analysis.” Gebser, 524 U.S. at 291. In Hill v. Cundiff, the school came perhaps closest to directly causing student sexual harassment when a school staff member devised
a scheme to catch one student in the act of sexual assault by using another student as
bait. 797 F.3d 948, 961–62 (11th Cir. 2015). However, an administrator, and not just
the school staff member who concocted this scheme, needed notice of the harassment
to be liable for causing it. Id. at 971–72. Consequently, even when the harassment the
school was potentially being held responsible for was almost directly caused by the
school, the school was still not liable for it. See id.
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but that person also has to be someone other than the wrongdoer.228
When that other person’s deliberate indifference causes further sexual harassment, therefore, it indirectly causes it.229 To that point, the
Court therefore said that a school is deliberately indifferent when it
“effectively” causes or “subjects” a student to sexual harassment as opposed to directly causes it.230
In addition, by proscribing schools’ responses that make students
“vulnerable” or “liable” to sexual harassment, the standard can also
proscribe schools’ actions, or lack thereof, that put students at risk for
but do not in fact cause further sexual harassment. 231 Because a

228. See supra notes 225, 227 and accompanying text; infra note 230 and accompanying text.
229. See supra notes 225, 227 and accompanying text; infra note 230 and accompanying text.
230. Davis, 526 U.S. at 642, 644. In Gebser, the Court explained:
When a teacher’s sexual harassment is imputed to a school district or when
a school district is deemed to have “constructively” known of the teacher’s
harassment, by assumption the district had no actual knowledge of the
teacher’s conduct. Nor, of course, did the district have an opportunity to take
action to end the harassment or to limit further harassment.
524 U.S. at 289. That said, this reasoning is open to substantial critique. Notably, in his
dissent, Justice Stevens argued that agency principles should govern liability in part
because “[teacher] Waldrop’s sexual abuse of his student . . . was made possible only
by Waldrop’s affirmative misuse of his authority as her teacher.” Id. at 300. However,
the person or persons responsible for addressing the harm can directly cause secondary trauma and institutional betrayal and in this way exacerbate the harm. See supra
Part I.D.3.
231. Because a student can be vulnerable to or liable for sexual harassment but
then not actually experience any harassment, some courts have articulated the deliberate indifference standard this way. See, e.g., Fitzgerald v. Barnstable Sch. Comm., 504
F.3d 165, 172 (1st Cir. 2007) (rejecting the district court’s interpretation of deliberate
indifference because it incorrectly said “that a Title IX defendant could not be found
deliberately indifferent as long as the plaintiff was not subjected to any acts of severe,
pervasive, and objectively offensive harassment after the defendant first acquired actual knowledge of the offending conduct” when instead deliberate indifference can also
take “the form of a failure ‘to take any precautions that would prevent future attacks’”
(quoting Williams v. Bd. of Regents, 477 F.3d 1282, 1297 (11th Cir. 2007))). That said,
despite articulating the standard this way, these courts do not then apply it such that
they in fact evaluate for risk or cause. See id.; infra note 256 and accompanying text;
see also Rost ex rel. K.C. v. Steamboat Springs RE-2 Sch. Dist., 511 F.3d 1114 (10th Cir.
2008); KF ex rel. CF v. Monroe Woodbury Cent. Sch. Dist., 531 F. App’x 132 (2d Cir.
2013); infra note 259 and accompanying text. Although the Tenth Circuit both described deliberate indifference as prohibiting schools’ responses that make students
vulnerable to, or risk, further sexual harassment and applied the standard that way, it
did so in the context of a university student’s claim. Farmer v. Kan. State Univ., 918 F.3d
1094, 1103–04 (10th Cir. 2019) (“We conclude, then, that Plaintiffs can state a viable
Title IX claim for student-on-student harassment by alleging that [Kansas State
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student can be vulnerable or liable to sexual harassment but then not
actually experience any harassment, the standard can hold schools to
account for such risk.232 That said, this risk that the standard can preclude is more than the abstract potential for sexual harassment that
any student faces given the high rate at which it occurs in public
schools.233 This risk is a particularized one in that it exists only because of a school’s response to previously occurring sexual harassment.234 In addition, it cannot be a vague, nascent risk that has no real
effect but instead must deprive students of the benefits and opportunities of school.235
University’s] deliberate indifference caused them to be ‘vulnerable to’ further harassment without requiring an allegation of subsequent actual sexual harassment.”).
232. See Davis v. Monroe Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 644–45 (1999); Fitzgerald, 504 F.3d 165; supra note 231 and accompanying text. The meaning of the words
“liable” and “vulnerable” involve potential, as opposed to actual, occurrences. “Liable”
means “being in a position to incur” as opposed to having something actually occur.
Liable, MERRIAM WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/liable
[https://perma.cc/J4PD-TGHS]. “Vulnerable” means “capable of being physically or
emotionally wounded” as opposed to actually being so wounded. Vulnerable, MERRIAM
WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/vulnerable [https://perma
.cc/2AZY-W9ZM].
233. See supra notes 44–45 and accompanying text. This conceptualization of deliberate indifference as inquiring into and precluding risk finds roots in Justice O’Connor’s opinion in Board of County Commissioners v. Brown. 520 U.S. 397, 411 (1997) (“A
plaintiff must demonstrate that a municipal decision reflects deliberate indifference to
the risk that a violation of a particular constitutional or statutory right will follow the
decision.”); see also Brake, supra note 73, at 18–19 (reviewing the deliberate indifference standard in other contexts, including police misconduct and failure to train cases).
Courts have rejected the argument that schools’ notice of the risk of sexual harassment
alone when none has yet occurred satisfies the notice prong of the Title IX analysis that
triggers schools’ obligation to act in ways that are not deliberately indifferent. See, e.g.,
Fitzgerald, 504 F.3d at 178; supra note 220 and accompanying text; see also Ray v. Bowers, 767 F. Supp. 2d 575, 580–81 (D.S.C. 2009) (“Title IX’s actual notice requirement
cannot be satisfied by ‘actual notice of a substantial risk of ongoing sexual abuse.’ Rather, the Court held that ‘Gebser is quite clear, however, that Title IX liability may be
imposed only upon a showing that the [school] officials possessed actual knowledge of
the discriminatory conduct in question.’” (citations omitted) (quoting Baynard v.
Malone, 268 F.3d 228, 237–38 (4th Cir. 2001))). Once schools have actual notice that
some sexual harassment has occurred, however, then the deliberate indifference
standard requires risk mitigation. Davis, 526 U.S. at 646–47 (noting that schools “may
be liable for ‘subject[ing]’ their students to discrimination where the [school] is deliberately indifferent to known acts of student-on-student harassment”).
234. See supra notes 220, 225, 230 and accompanying text.
235. Davis, 526 U.S. at 650; supra note 65 and accompanying text; see Rost, 511
F.3d 1114; supra notes 157–66. Although when schools are deliberately indifferent by
causing student sexual harassment the student also must show a loss of educational
benefit, the courts rarely reach this issue. Instead, they deny claims more commonly
on the actual notice and deliberate indifference prong. See, e.g., Stiles ex rel. D.S. v.
Grainger Cnty., 819 F.3d 834, 849–50 (6th Cir. 2016) (“To establish a prima facie case
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Further, both the causal and the risk facets of deliberate indifference implicitly require that schools take affirmative steps to avoid
causing or putting students at risk for further sexual harassment.236
Because the only way for a school to avoid putting students at risk for
or indirectly causing further sexual harassment is to take action to
that end, the standard implicitly demands such affirmative protective
steps.237 By essentially requiring schools to act affirmatively to protect students in these ways, the deliberate indifference standard is almost exceptional in what it can require schools to do.238 However exceptional the standard’s requirements may arguably be, though, these
affirmative protections are not unlimited. The deliberate indifference
standard does not mandate that schools’ interventions remedy the
harassment. 239 It can, though, require schools to attempt to protect
against risking or causing its recurrence.240
B. SUBVERTING TITLE IX: HOW THE COURTS CIRCUMSCRIBE ALMOST
COMPLETELY THE MEANING OF DELIBERATE INDIFFERENCE
The lower courts’ assessments of deliberate indifference in K–12
public school students’ Title IX claims, however, disregard these explanations offered by the Supreme Court. 241 Rather than examining
whether schools’ responses to student sexual harassment put students at risk for or caused further sexual harassment, the courts evaluate students’ Title IX claims solely on the basis of the Supreme
Court’s additional guidance that schools’ responses cannot be “clearly
of student-on-student sexual harassment, [a student] must demonstrate the following
elements: (1) sexual harassment so severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive that it
could be said to deprive the plaintiff of access to the educational opportunities or benefits provided by the school, (2) the funding recipient had actual knowledge of the sexual harassment, and (3) the funding recipient was deliberately indifferent to the harassment,” but then disposing of the case by finding “that Plaintiffs failed to create a
triable issue as to whether Defendants exhibited deliberate indifference.”).
236. See infra note 237 and accompanying text.
237. See Davis, 526 U.S. at 645–46. The Court’s descriptions of how schools’ liability results from their own responses to sexual harassment underscore this demand for
affirmative action. Id. The Court said that the school does not violate Title IX because
the wrongdoer’s actions are “treated” as those of the school’s. Id. at 645. Instead, the
school is “directly liable for its own failure to act.” Id. at 645–46. In other words, Title
IX requires that schools act, and they must act to prevent students’ vulnerability to, or
risk of, sexual harassment and assault.
238. See supra note 219 and accompanying text.
239. The Supreme Court made plain that the standard did not require proof that a
school remedied the sexual harassment. See Davis, 526 U.S. at 648.
240. See supra notes 219, 237 and accompanying text.
241. See infra Part II.B.2.
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unreasonable.”242 The lower courts thus annul the deliberate indifference standard’s full meaning and permit schools to respond in any
way other than not at all.243 They therefore undermine almost entirely
the standard’s protective capacity.244
1. “Clear Unreasonableness” in Context
After explaining the deliberate indifference standard in Davis ex
rel. D. v. Monroe County Board of Education as prohibiting schools’ responses to student sexual harassment that both cause students to undergo and make them vulnerable to further harassment, the Supreme
Court went on to offer further guidance about the standard. 245 Responding to the dissent’s objections about the implications of imposing Title IX liability for peer sexual harassment, the Court said that deliberate indifference requires schools to respond to sexual
harassment in ways that are “not clearly unreasonable.” 246 Because
this additional guidance was both provided in response to the Davis
dissent and on the heels of the Court’s causal and risk descriptions of
deliberate indifference, however, this “not clearly unreasonable” language cannot be read out of that full context.247 Read in that context, a
deliberately indifferent response is one that is not clearly unreasonable because it neither makes a student vulnerable to nor indirectly
causes further sexual harassment.248 Put the other way, a clearly unreasonable response is one that puts students at risk for or causes
their further sexual harassment.249
More specifically, when the Supreme Court offered this “not
clearly unreasonable” guidance, 250 it was addressing the Davis dissent’s strenuously voiced predictions that holding schools liable for
peer sexual harassment would require them to both remedy the harassment and ensure that all students conform to particular modes of
conduct.251 In response, the Court said that the deliberate indifference
242. Davis, 526 U.S. at 648.
243. See infra notes 264–65, 278–79, 284 and accompanying text.
244. See infra Part II.B.2.
245. Davis, 526 U.S. at 648.
246. Id. at 649.
247. Id.; see infra notes 251–53 and accompanying text.
248. See infra notes 251–53 and accompanying text.
249. See infra notes 251–53 and accompanying text; see also supra note 231 and
accompanying text; infra note 260 and accompanying text.
250. Davis, 526 U.S. at 648.
251. Id. at 666, 668 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). The dissent was nearly apoplectic in
its warnings about the catastrophes that would result from holding schools responsible for peer sexual harassment. Id. It argued that the majority was requiring schools to

2021]

SUBVERTING TITLE IX

2295

standard requires neither.252 It explained that school administrators
would “continue to enjoy the [disciplinary] flexibility they require” because they need only respond to peer sexual harassment in a manner
not “clearly unreasonable in light of known circumstances.”253
As much as the Court in Davis thus limited deliberate indifference
by precluding any requirement that schools remedy a student’s sexual
harassment or ensure conformity with particular modes of conduct,
however, the Court did not supersede its description of deliberate indifference as prohibiting schools’ responses that cause or make students vulnerable to further sexual harassment.254 To the contrary, after offering the idea that schools’ responses to sexual harassment
need be “not clearly unreasonable,” the Court then reiterated and applied the deliberate indifference standard to the facts of the case without any mention at all of clear unreasonableness.255 It concluded that
student Lashonda Davis “may be able to show both actual knowledge
and deliberate indifference on the part of the [school], which made no
effort whatsoever to investigate or put an end to [her] harassment.”256
“ensur[e] that thousands of immature students conform their conduct to acceptable
norms,” and that unlike the requirements of the majority opinion, “[o]ur decision in
Gebser did not, of course, recognize some ill-defined, free-standing legal duty on
schools to remedy discrimination by third parties.” Id. It further warned that holding
schools liable for peer sexual harassment would leave them devoid of disciplinary flexibility. Id. at 657–58 (“The only certainty flowing from the majority’s decision is that
scarce resources will be diverted from educating our children and that many school
districts, desperate to avoid Title IX peer harassment suits, will adopt whatever federal
code of student conduct and discipline the Department of Education sees fit to impose
upon them.” (footnote omitted)). The dissent’s consternation was misplaced. Its reasons for wanting to avoid holding schools responsible for peer sexual harassment under Title IX were based on misconceptions. See Suski, supra note 17, at 752 (“[D]espite
the Davis dissent’s predictions that any Title IX liability would usher in a flood of litigation, no such flood has come to pass. Although sexual assault occurs at alarmingly
high rates in public schools, complaints and lawsuits against schools based on them do
not. Thousands of sexual assaults were reported in public schools from 2011 to 2015,
but in 2016, the U.S. Department of Education Office of Civil Rights opened only 83
sexual harassment investigations in public elementary and secondary schools.”).
252. Davis, 526 U.S. at 648–49 (“The dissent consistently mischaracterizes this
standard to require funding recipients to ‘remedy’ peer harassment and to ‘ensur[e]
that . . . students conform their conduct to’ certain rules. Title IX imposes no such requirements.” (alterations in original) (citations omitted)).
253. Id. at 648 (“We thus disagree with respondents’ contention that, if Title IX
provides a cause of action for student-on-student harassment, ‘nothing short of expulsion of every student accused of misconduct involving sexual overtones would protect
school systems from liability or damages.’”).
254. Id. at 654.
255. Id. at 648–49.
256. Id. at 654.
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This application of deliberate indifference in the evaluation of Davis’s
claim without any discussion of clear unreasonableness demonstrates
that far from supplanting the Court’s explanation of deliberate indifference as embracing risk and causal dimensions, the Court’s clear unreasonableness language operates in conjunction with those concepts. 257 Clearly unreasonable responses, therefore, are those
responses that put students at risk for or indirectly cause further sexual harassment.258 Assessing for clear unreasonableness in this way,
therefore, requires courts to inquire into what, if any, role a school’s
response to student sexual harassment had in putting that student at
risk for or causing further sexual harassment.259
2. Reducing Deliberate Indifference to a Decontextualized
Determination of Clear Unreasonableness
The lower courts, however, do not apply the “clearly unreasonable” benchmark in light of this context and meaning when evaluating
K–12 public school students’ claims. 260 Instead, they evaluate
257. See id.
258. See supra note 231 and accompanying text; infra note 260 and accompanying
text.
259. See supra notes 253, 258 and accompanying text; infra note 260 and accompanying text.
260. In KF ex rel. CF v. Monroe Woodbury Central School District, the Second Circuit
almost considered whether the public school caused sexual harassment when it evaluated the claim of middle school student C.F., who endured two years of sexual harassment and assault by multiple students. 531 F. App’x 132, 133 (2d Cir. 2013). It said that
deliberate indifference calls for an inquiry into “whether the school ‘cause[d C.F.] to
undergo harassment or [made her] . . . vulnerable to it.’” Id. at 134 (citing Davis, 526
U.S. at 645). Yet the court then did not assess cause or vulnerability when it concluded
that the school was not deliberately indifferent when it offered C.F. a disciplinary
placement or at-home tutoring in response to her sexual harassment and assault. Id.
Likewise, in Rost ex rel. K.C. v. Steamboat Springs RE-2 School District, the Tenth Circuit
suggested it evaluated for risk and cause when it said that the school’s failure to address middle school student K.C.’s sexual harassment and assault “did not cause K.C. to
undergo harassment or make her liable or vulnerable to it.” 511 F.3d 1114, 1123 (10th
Cir. 2008). Yet the Tenth Circuit then neglected to apply that standard in any meaningful way, or at all. See id. at 1123–24; supra notes 156–67 and accompanying text. Instead, it simply said that the school “was not clearly unreasonable [because] school
officials immediately contacted law enforcement officials, cooperated fully in the investigation, and kept informed of the investigation.” Rost, 511 F.3d at 1121. As if to
emphasize the sufficiency of the school’s response, the court also insisted that schools
“need not expel every student accused of sexual harassment” and therefore no particular action is required of the schools. Id. at 1123. Although the Supreme Court did say
that schools do not need to take any particular disciplinary action to satisfy the deliberate indifference standard, it did not say that a school could take no action to address
the cause or effects of a student’s sexual harassment in the school setting. Davis, 526
U.S. at 648. As the dissent in Rost noted, “[i]t is a bit unclear why the majority concludes
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deliberate indifference on the basis of clear unreasonableness alone,
as they independently conceive of it, and without regard for whether
a school’s response to a student’s sexual harassment indirectly caused
or put the student at risk of further sexual harassment.261 In doing so,
some courts explicitly develop their own definitions of clear unreasonableness and others do not.262 Either way, the lower courts avoid
entirely an analysis of the relationship between schools’ responses to
initially reported sexual harassment and students’ subsequent sexual
harassment.263
One way courts explicitly develop their own definitions of clear
unreasonableness is by describing clear unreasonableness exclusively
in terms of what it is not.264 These courts say that a clearly unreasonable response to sexual harassment is not the same as an ineffective

that this total inaction was reasonable under the circumstances.” 511 F.3d at 1129
(McConnell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The discrepancies between
these courts’ descriptions of the deliberate indifference standard and their application
of it may reflect some ambivalence about school liability more generally in the same
way it may, as one scholar has argued, reveal an ambivalence underlying the courts’
treatment of municipal liability for civil rights violations. See Avidan Y. Cover, Revisionist Municipal Liability, 52 GA. L. REV. 375, 389 (2018). To put a finer point on the root
of that potential ambivalence, the courts’ rationales for limiting school liability in both
Title IX and certain Fourteenth Amendment claims are rooted in a number of misconceptions. See Suski, supra note 17 and accompanying text.
261. See infra notes 264–65, 278–79, 284 and accompanying text.
262. See infra notes 264–65, 278–79, 284 and accompanying text.
263. See infra notes 264–65, 278–79, 284 and accompanying text.
264. Other courts have developed definitions of “clear unreasonableness” that
evaluate the relationship between a school’s response and the degree of notice it received. In McCoy v. Board of Education, for example, in rejecting elementary school student John Doe’s Title IX claim based on his sexual molestation by teacher Gary Stroup,
the Sixth Circuit said that a school’s repeated use of verbal and written reprimands in
response to reports that Stroup molested a student and inappropriately touched others were not clearly unreasonable because the reported harassment was not “more
discernable and explicit.” 515 F. App’x 387, 392 (6th Cir. 2013). The court held:
[I]t was not clearly unreasonable for the school district to have issued letters
directing Stroup not to engage in such physical contact. Had there been a
more discernible and explicit form of sexual harassment, in the form of verbal
or physical sexual contact, the district’s decision to repeat its measures may
have constituted deliberate indifference.
Id. The court thus defined a clearly unreasonable response in proportion to the specificity of the notice the school received and so did not evaluate the school’s response
for risk or cause. Id. Consequently, it found the repeated use of failed responses that
risked John Doe’s assault not deliberately indifferent even though those responses all
but signaled the harassment could continue and so indirectly caused its recurrence.
See id.
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one.265 They thus find that schools’ ineffective responses, without limitation, satisfy the deliberate indifference standard. 266 By categorically deeming ineffective responses not clearly unreasonable without
any limiting principle, these courts thus define “not clearly unreasonable” responses to mean all ineffective as well as effective responses—
or, any response at all—to sexual harassment.267
For example, in Porto v. Town of Tewksbury, the First Circuit declined to find a school’s repeated use of the same failed responses to
address student R.C.’s ongoing sexual harassment of elementary
school student S.C. clearly unreasonable. 268 In doing so, the court
failed to assess whether those responses indirectly caused S.C.’s continued sexual harassment.269 In response to student R.C.’s persistent
265. See K.S. v. Nw. Indep. Sch. Dist., 689 F. App’x 780, 784, 786 (5th Cir. 2017)
(considering that the school “took some action in response to” sixth grade student
K.S.’s repeated sexual harassment, the court found the school did not act clearly unreasonably and therefore with deliberate indifference because “a [school] is liable only
when its responses to such harassment are clearly unreasonable in light of known circumstances. The [school] cannot be liable because its disciplinary choices were not effective.” (citation omitted)). Instead of defining “clearly unreasonable” responses as
not ineffective responses, the Fifth Circuit defined “clearly unreasonable” responses as
not inadequate responses. See Doe ex rel. Doe v. Dall. Indep. Sch. Dist., 220 F.3d 380,
388 (5th Cir. 2000). There, the court considered evidence that John Earl McGrew molested elementary school student J.H., among other students, over a four-year period,
culminating in his arrest, conviction on sex abuse charges, and life sentence in prison.
Id. at 381. To establish the school’s deliberate indifference, J.H. presented evidence that
the principal responded to his report of molestation by meeting with J.H. and McGrew
together and then warning McGrew not to repeat the behavior. Id. at 388. The court
noted the shortcomings in the principal’s response, including that the principal did not
“tell McGrew not to spank a child again, failed to monitor McGrew further or make him
attend additional training, and failed . . . to ever raise the issue of sexual abuse with him
again until his arrest.” Id. Additionally, the principal told McGrew, “I don’t think [the
accusation is] true, but we have to meet with the parent and discuss it,” and McGrew
described the principal’s “demeanor toward him as ‘supportive.’” Id. In determining
deliberate indifference, however, the court concluded that without more “we cannot
say . . . that these actions, though ineffective in preventing McGrew from sexually abusing students, were an inadequate response to J.H.’s allegation.” Id. Consequently, it
found the school did not act with deliberate indifference. Id. Further, the court did not
even fully assess the inadequacy of the school’s response. The court neglected to explain why failing to do anything more than mete out a half-hearted warning coupled
with reassurances that the principal did not believe the reports were not inadequate.
Id.
266. See supra note 265 and accompanying text.
267. See K.S., 689 F. App’x 780; supra note 265 and accompanying text; Rost ex rel.
K.C. v. Steamboat Springs RE-2 Sch. Dist., 511 F.3d 1114 (10th Cir. 2008); supra notes
156–67 and accompanying text; Doe v. Bd. of Educ., 605 F. App’x 159 (4th Cir. 2015);
infra note 278 and accompanying text.
268. 488 F.3d 67, 74–76 (1st Cir. 2007).
269. Id. at 74.
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harassment of student S.C. over a period of six years, the school repeatedly separated the students in limited ways to virtually no
avail. 270 Assessing the school’s continued use of these failed responses, the court concluded, without more, that those responses did
not “establish . . . the steps taken [by the school] were clearly unreasonable in light of the circumstances known [because] . . . [t]he test for
whether a school should be liable under Title IX for student-on-student harassment is not one of effectiveness by hindsight.” 271 To be
sure, ineffectiveness alone does not suffice to demonstrate clear unreasonableness or deliberate indifference. 272 A student could suffer
further sexual harassment either because of the school’s intervention
or despite it.273 Without inquiring further, though, the court failed to
make this determination and so did not assess for whether the school
risked or indirectly caused R.C.’s continued harassment of S.C.274
Had the court made this assessment, it could have easily determined that the school’s repeated use of a failed intervention both put
S.C. at risk for and indirectly caused his additional sexual harassment. 275 By knowingly and repeatedly implementing this failed response, the school did virtually nothing to prevent R.C.’s continued
harassment and allowed, or indirectly caused, its recurrence.276 Consequently, the court could have found the school acted clearly unreasonably and with deliberate indifference.277 Yet, by avoiding such a
nuanced evaluation, the First Circuit effectively concluded that both
ineffective and effective responses, or any non-action at all, are sufficient to show a school did not act in a clearly unreasonable, and therefore deliberately indifferent, manner.278
270. Id. at 70.
271. Id. at 74.
272. See infra note 348 and accompanying text.
273. See infra note 348 and accompanying text; Porto, 488 F.3d at 74.
274. See Porto, 488 F.3d at 74.
275. See id. at 70–71.
276. See id.
277. See supra Part II.A.
278. See Porto, 488 F.3d 67. Similarly, in Doe v. Board of Education, the Fourth Circuit rejected the claim of fourth grade student J.D., who was sexually harassed and assaulted by fellow student M.O., even though the school sometimes did not respond at
all to J.D.’s reports of harassment. 605 F. App’x 159, 162 (4th Cir. 2015). In rejecting
J.D.’s claim that the school violated Title IX with its responses to his reports of harassment, the court did not assess whether the school’s responses put J.D. at risk of further
harassment or indirectly caused any of it in order to find that they were not deliberately indifferent. Id. at 168. Instead, it insisted that the school’s responses, including
simply talking to the boys repeatedly, were “not clearly unreasonable” just because
they were not effective. Id.
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Other courts do not so explicitly define, or more accurately redefine, clear unreasonableness.279 In Gabrielle M. v. Park Forest-Chicago Heights School District 163, for instance, when kindergarten student Gabrielle suffered multiple sexual assaults by fellow kindergartner Jason, the school decided the children needed to be
separated. 280 However, the school then continued to put both students together at recess, and Jason continued to assault Gabrielle.281
The Seventh Circuit found the school’s incompletely implemented response not clearly unreasonable, saying, “The record reveals that the
school district’s response to Jason’s inappropriate conduct was not
clearly unreasonable. After each reported or observed instance involving Jason and other students . . . steps were taken to prevent future inappropriate conduct.” 282 However, the court did not explain
how the school’s failure to fully execute its chosen response could protect Gabrielle against the risk of future attacks and so did not constitute a clearly unreasonable response.283 Avoiding this evaluation, the
court sanctioned the school’s response that allowed Jason access to
her and enabled, or indirectly caused, her continued harassment.284
Under the court’s reasoning, the fact that the school took some steps,
any at all, therefore, sufficed to show its response was not clearly unreasonable.285 It did not matter that the school’s response was not designed or implemented in a way that would avoid risking or indirectly
causing further harassment.286
Whether the courts explicitly or implicitly develop their own definitions of what constitutes a “clearly unreasonable” response to student sexual harassment, they consistently forego an evaluation of
whether such responses indirectly caused or put students at risk for
more sexual harassment. 287 Reducing deliberate indifference to an
279. For example, in Stiles v. Grainger County, the Sixth Circuit concluded that
Rutledge Middle School’s repeated use of reprimands to address student D.S.’s peer
sexual harassment was not clearly unreasonable and so not deliberately indifferent.
819 F.3d 834, 851 (6th Cir. 2016). Its only justification for this conclusion, however,
was that the responses “were reasonably tailored to the findings of each investigation”
into the harassment, without explaining how some repeating ineffective responses
could be so tailored and therefore not clearly unreasonable. Id.
280. 315 F.3d 817, 819–20 (7th Cir. 2003).
281. Id.
282. Id. at 824.
283. Id. at 825.
284. See id.
285. See id.
286. See id.
287. See supra notes 269–70, 282–83 and accompanying text.
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assessment of clear unreasonableness alone, as they independently
conceive of it, the lower courts circumscribe almost completely the
standard’s meaning.288 Consequently, they find that virtually any response by the public schools to student sexual harassment, other than
none at all, satisfies the standard, even when those responses both put
students at risk for and cause their further sexual harassment.289 If the
courts instead applied deliberate indifference consistent with its full
potential, however, they could proscribe these responses and their
consequent harms.290
To be sure, the lower courts do require that K–12 schools do
something in response to student sexual harassment and hold them
accountable when they do nothing at all.291 They do, therefore, proscribe schools’ complete indifference to student sexual harassment in
the general sense of the word.292 Had the Supreme Court intended deliberate indifference to only require any response other than none at
288. To be fair, the assessment of deliberate indifference is not a simple or easy
one. The Supreme Court acknowledged as much in the § 1983 line of cases from which
it drew the deliberate indifference standard as the vehicle for determining Title IX
claims. In Board of Commissioners v. Brown, the Court noted that “[c]laims not involving
an allegation that the municipal action itself violated federal law, or directed or authorized the deprivation of federal rights, present much more difficult problems of proof.”
520 U.S. 397, 406 (1997). However, it has also expressed confidence in courts’ ability
to navigate these difficulties. City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 391 (1989) (“Predicting how a hypothetically well-trained officer would have acted under the circumstances may not be an easy task for the factfinder, particularly since matters of judgment may be involved, and since officers who are well trained are not free from error
and perhaps might react very much like the untrained officer in similar circumstances.
But judge and jury, doing their respective jobs, will be adequate to the task.”).
289. See supra notes 269, 275–76 and accompanying text. When a school does in
fact do nothing at all in response to a report of a student’s sexual harassment or assault,
courts have found that those complete failures to respond demonstrate deliberate indifference. In J.M. ex rel. Morris v. Hilldale Independent School District No. 1-29, for example, the Tenth Circuit found that because the school did nothing at all in response to
a band teacher’s sexual relationship with high school student J.M., the school acted
with deliberate indifference. 397 F. App’x 445, 454 (10th Cir. 2010). The court noted,
“[I]t was undisputed that after [the] report, no school official conducted any investigation of [the band teacher].” Id. Similarly, in Doe v. School Board, the Eleventh Circuit
found that when a school “effectively did nothing other than obtain a written statement” and conducted “no investigation, formal or informal” of allegations of a teacher’s
sexual harassment of a student, that failure to do anything could constitute deliberate
indifference. 604 F.3d 1248, 1261 (11th Cir. 2010).
290. See supra Part I.D.3.
291. See supra note 289 and accompanying text.
292. “Indifferent” is defined as, among other things, “neutral.” Indifferent, MERRIAM
WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/indifferent [https://perma
.cc/AE9T-GEG8]. Under this meaning of the word, a school would be indifferent if it
remained neutral, or did nothing, in the face of known sexual harassment.
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all to sexual harassment, however, it surely would have said that. Instead, it described a far more complex standard.293 By disregarding
the full conceptualization of deliberate indifference, the lower courts
redefine the standard such that it is satisfied by any action by schools,
no matter what it is or whether it serves Title IX’s protective purpose.
The lower courts’ interpretations of the deliberate indifference standard, therefore, subvert Title IX’s purpose and its potential protective
effects.294
C. THE TITLE IX SUBVERSION: A MATTER OF PARTICULAR URGENCY FOR K–
12 PUBLIC SCHOOL STUDENTS
Although Congress enacted Title IX to fill the gap left where other
laws failed to provide students protection from sexual harassment
and other forms of sex discrimination in the public schools, the lower
courts’ assessments of the deliberate indifference standard allow the
very harm the law seeks to prevent. 295 Further, because courts’ assessments particularly affect K–12 public school students’ claims, the
courts’ problematic interpretations are a matter of urgency because
these students face unique vulnerabilities. 296 Other laws offer additional protections from sexual harassment and assault to college and
university students, but younger students do not have these same
structural protections. 297 Further, younger students are more likely
than older students to suffer certain long-term harms from sexual harassment and assault.298
While federal laws, notably the Clery Act, require colleges and
universities to specifically act to prevent and protect students from
sexual harassment and assault, these laws do not apply to K–12 public
293. See Davis v. Monroe Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 644–48 (1999); supra
Part II.A.
294. See Davis, 526 U.S. 629; supra note 60 and accompanying text; supra Part
II.B.2.
295. Although other laws, including the Fourteenth Amendment and tort law,
could have offered protections against sexual harassment, sexual assault, and other
forms of sex discrimination, they did not. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; supra note 219
and accompanying text. As Senator Birch Bayh, who sponsored Title IX, said in introducing the amendment in Congress,
[O]ne of the greatest failings of the educational system in the continuation of
corrosive and unjustified sex discrimination against women. It is clear to me
that sex discrimination reaches all facets of education . . . [and t]he only antidote is a comprehensive amendment such as the one now before the Senate.
118 CONG. REC. S5803 (daily ed. Feb. 28, 1972) (statement of Sen. Birch Bayh).
296. See infra notes 302, 304, 306, 308, 310 and accompanying text.
297. See infra notes 299–304 and accompanying text.
298. See infra notes 308, 310 and accompanying text.
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schools.299 The Clery Act require colleges and universities to, among
other things, report instances of crimes, including forcible and nonforcible sex offenses that occur on campus, in campus buildings off
campus, and on public property.300 In addition, colleges and universities must develop and implement affirmative programs to prevent
sexual violence on campus.301
Public K–12 schools, however, operate under none of these Clery
Act requirements.302 Consequently, unless state or local laws require
it, public schools do not need to report any sexual harassment and assault that occurs within their walls.303 For many schools, that means
either little or no reliable information exists on the incidences of sexual assault in schools.304 In addition, unlike college and university students, students in K–12 public schools do not have the benefit of any
affirmative preventative programs aimed at deterring sexual harassment.305 By draining Title IX of its ability to protect students through
their assessments of deliberate indifference, the courts therefore
299. 20 U.S.C. § 1092(f).
300. Id. § 1092(f)(1)(F). Colleges and universities must comply with these requirements as a condition of participation in federal financial assistance programs. Id.
§ 1092(f).
301. Id. § 1092(f)(8). Such programs must include information on the definitions
of consent, “safe and positive options for bystander intervention . . . information on
risk reduction to recognize warning signs of abusive behavior . . . [and] ongoing prevention and awareness campaigns for students and faculty.” Id.
302. See id. § 1092(f). Discussing the difference in protections available in colleges
and universities as compared to the K–12 public schools, civil rights advocate and frequent Title IX litigator Adele Kimmel has said, “What you see most commonly is that
colleges are far ahead of K–12 schools in the development of their sexual-misconduct
policies and procedures, their training, and their education of staff and students, making sure that students know who the Title IX coordinator is.” Mark Keierleber, The
Younger Victims of Sexual Violence in School, ATLANTIC (Aug. 10, 2017), https://www
.theatlantic.com/education/archive/2017/08/the-younger-victims-of-sexual
-violence-in-school/536418 [https://perma.cc/38J5-S4WQ].
303. See 20 U.S.C. § 1092(f).
304. A survey conducted by the Associated Press found:
[Although] 32 states and the District of Columbia track student sexual assaults . . . some did so only if incidents led to discipline like suspension or expulsion; the other states, including Maine, did not. . . . [Consequently s]ome of
the nation’s largest school districts reported zero sexual assaults over a
multi-year period, and some state education officials told AP they doubted
their districts’ numbers.
Robin McDowell, Reese Dunklin, Emily Schmall & Justin Pritchard, Hidden Horror of
School Sex Assaults Revealed by AP, ASSOCIATED PRESS (May 1, 2017), https://www.ap
.org/explore/schoolhouse-sex-assault/hidden-horror-of-school-sex-assaults
-revealed-by-ap.html [https://perma.cc/ZZK5-5XFV].
305. See 20 U.S.C. § 1092(f).
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further weaken the already relatively low threshold of protections
available to K–12 public school students.306
Not only do K–12 public school students lack these more comprehensive legal protections, but K–12 public school students who are
sexually assaulted also face a higher likelihood of suffering sexual assault again later in life.307 Children who suffer a sexual assault are almost fourteen times more likely to “experience a rape or attempted
rape in their first year of college.”308 Because under the courts’ interpretations of deliberate indifference Title IX requires schools to do almost nothing to prevent sexual assaults, the consequences of the
courts’ evaluations thus represent both an immediate problem and a
long-term risk of further harassment.309
Further, children who have been sexually abused are more likely
to themselves become abusive as they age into adolescence.310 Yet, interventions can work to stop the cycle.311 By failing to require schools
306. Although the Clery Act has not been without implementation problems, it still
provides more information and protection to college and university students than to
K–12 students, for whom it provides nothing. See, e.g., Nancy Chi Cantalupo, And Even
More of Us Are Brave: Intersectionality & Sexual Harassment of Women Students of Color,
42 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 1, 74 (2019) (“The Clery Act’s effectiveness in disseminating
information about gender-based violence has been hampered by various factors.”).
307. See supra note 302 and accompanying text; infra note 308 and accompanying
text.
308. Kevin Lalor & Rosaleen McElvaney, Child Sexual Abuse, Links to Later Sexual
Exploitation/High-Risk Sexual Behavior, and Prevention/Treatment Programs, 11
TRAUMA VIOLENCE & ABUSE 159, 163 (2010) (“Respondents who had an experience of
rape or attempted rape in their adolescent years were 13.7 times more likely to experience rape or attempted rape in their first year of college.”); see also Child Sexual Abuse
Statistics, NAT’L CTR. FOR VICTIMS CRIME, https://victimsofcrime.org/child-sexual-abuse
-statistics [https://perma.cc/JBC2-N7YH] (referencing the same statistic).
309. See supra Part I.D; supra note 306 and accompanying text.
310. One study of child sex abuse victims found that they were “7.6 times more
likely to [later] be charged with sexual offences than the general population.” JAMES
R.P. OGLOFF, MARGARET C. CUTAJAR, EMILY MANN & PAUL MULLEN, AUSTRALIAN INST. OF
CRIMINOLOGY, TRENDS & ISSUES IN CRIME & CRIM. JUST. NO. 440, CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE AND
SUBSEQUENT OFFENDING AND VICTIMISATION: A 45 YEAR FOLLOW-UP STUDY 1, 5 (2012),
https://www.aic.gov.au/sites/default/files/2020-05/tandi440.pdf [https://perma
.cc/3YTH-CEND]. A prior study found that between one-quarter and one-third of child
sex offenders report a history of child sex abuse. R.K. Hanson & S. Slater, Sexual Victimization in the History of Sexual Abusers: A Review, 1 ANNALS OF SEX RSCH. 485, 495
(1988).
311. E.g., Elizabeth J. Letourneau & Charles Borduin, The Effective Treatment of Juveniles Who Sexually Offend: An Ethical Imperative, 18 ETHICS & BEHAV. 286, 298–99
(2008). This study described the positive outcomes for reducing recidivism among
sexual aggressive juveniles with the use of multisystemic therapy (MST). Id. In the MST
model, “the youth is viewed as being nested within a complex of interconnected systems that include the individual youth, the youth’s family, and various extrafamilial
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to adequately address these issues, the courts’ evaluations of the deliberate indifference standard allow schools to cause more sexual harassment and assault, and therefore do practically nothing to address
that cycle.312 The courts not only leave most students suffering sexual
assault and trauma in school with almost no remedy, but they also allow schools to do more harm to them in the long as well as the short
term. 313 For K–12 public school students, therefore, Title IX represents a particularly hollow promise.
III. REMEDYING THE “ABSURDITY”
When the Supreme Court determined that a remedy in damages
is available under Title IX’s private enforcement scheme, it said that a
contrary conclusion would result in a “monstrous absurdity.”314 It explained that such a decision would undermine the law and its purpose
by “giving judges the power to render inutile causes of action authorized by Congress through a decision that no remedy is available.”315
(peer, school, neighborhood, community) contexts.” Id. at 297. Therefore,
the youth’s behavior is seen as the product of the reciprocal interplay between the youth and these systems and of the relations of the systems with
each other. . . . It is assumed, then, that youth behavior problems such as sexual aggression can be maintained by problematic transactions within any
given system or between some combination of pertinent systems.
Id. This study explained that three years post-treatment the recidivism rate for sexual
crimes among those who had received MST was only 12.5% as compared to a 75%
such rate for those who did not, and was 12.5% compared to 41.7% at an 8.9-year posttreatment point. Id. at 298–99.
312. See supra Parts I.A–D, II.B (describing schools’ failure to address student sexual harassment and courts’ subversion of the Title IX deliberate indifference standard).
313. See supra Parts I.A–D, II.C (describing the negative impact of sexual harassment on school children).
314. Franklin v. Gwinnett Cnty. Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60, 67 (1992) (“[T]he power to
enforce the performance of the [Title IX] must rest somewhere, or it will present a case
which has often been said to involve a monstrous absurdity in a well-organized government, that there should be no remedy, although a clear and undeniable right should
be shown to exist.” (quoting Kendall v. Stokes, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 524, 624 (1838))).
315. See id. at 74–75 (“Congress surely did not intend for federal moneys to be expended to support the intentional actions it sought by statute to proscribe.”). When it
found that Title IX has an implied private right of action, the Supreme Court rejected
the argument that only equitable relief should be available for its violation. Id. On the
topic, the Court only said:
[I]t is axiomatic that a court should determine the adequacy of a remedy in
law before resorting to equitable relief. Under the ordinary convention, the
proper inquiry would be whether monetary damages provided an adequate
remedy, and if not, whether equitable relief would be appropriate. . . . Moreover, in this case, the equitable remedies suggested by respondent and the
Federal Government are clearly inadequate. Backpay does nothing for
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Now, though, that monstrous absurdity has all but come to pass. By
draining the deliberate indifference standard of its meaningful content when assessing K–12 public school students’ Title IX claims, the
courts not only preclude a damages remedy for all but the most egregious Title IX claims, but they have also therefore effectively rendered
Title IX’s protections largely inutile.316
To resolve this legal absurdity and revive Title IX’s power to protect students, this Part proposes recasting the deliberate indifference
standard such that its implicit demand for schools to affirmatively
protect students from sexual harassment and assault is made explicit.317 This Part also offers a framework for the evaluation of this
recast standard.318 This standard and framework ensure that schools’
failures to respond even intermittently to reports of sexual harassment, their repeated use of failed responses without justification, and
their responses that punish or blame survivors violate Title IX.319 In
addition, this Part develops a new legal presumption aimed at
prompting schools to meaningfully design their responses to student
sexual harassment. 320 Finally, to support that same end, it recommends regulatory changes to strengthen schools’ responses to sexual
harassment.321 Such changes would force courts to hold not only K–
12 schools to account when they put students at risk for and cause
them further sexual harassment, but they would also apply to and
strengthen Title IX’s protections for any survivor of sexual harassment in any public school, no matter their school level.
petitioner, because she was a student when the alleged discrimination occurred. Similarly, because Hill—[the teacher that high school student Franklin] claims subjected her to sexual harassment—no longer teaches at the
school and [Franklin] herself no longer attends a school in the Gwinnett system, prospective relief accords her no remedy at all.
Id. at 75–76. That said, there is much value in plaintiffs bringing claims for damages as
well as injunctive relief. By ordering injunctive relief, courts can require schools to take
some of the specific fault-fixing steps that damages may prompt but do not require.
See, e.g., Adele Kimmel, Title IX: An Imperfect but Vital Tool To Stop Bullying of LGBT
Students, 125 YALE L.J. 2006, 2025–26 (2016) (“[L]awsuits generally have a greater impact when they also seek injunctive relief. This is because injunctive relief, whether by
judgment or settlement, allows bullied LGBT students to obtain broad reforms that can
change the climate in their schools.”).
316. See supra Part II.B (discussing how changes to the application of the deliberate indifference standard would better protect students and meet the goals of Title IX).
317. See infra Part III.A.
318. See infra Part III.A.
319. See supra Parts I.A–C; infra Part III.A.
320. See infra Part III.B.
321. See infra Part III.C.
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As a threshold matter, however, it is worth addressing the question of whether such changes and the consequent increased potential
for the award of money damages to students could have an effect on
remedying or preventing student sexual harassment. The Supreme
Court’s statements on that point notwithstanding, one might reasonably be skeptical.322 Damages certainly cannot truly remediate a harm
like sexual harassment that leaves deep, lasting wounds. 323 Yet, a
damages remedy nevertheless serves at least two important functions. First, a damages remedy signals general social recognition of the
injustice meted out by the state.324 Second, it can prompt structural
reforms that prevent future civil rights violations. 325 Even scholars
322. Scholars have expressed concerns with the value and efficacy of damages
awards and the imposition of liability on the government in at least some kinds of
§ 1983 claims. See, e.g., John C. Jeffries, Jr., In Praise of the Eleventh Amendment and
Section 1983, 84 VA. L. REV. 47, 75 (1998) (stating that government liability based on a
failure to act creates perverse incentives because “[t]he causal connection between the
plaintiff’s injury and an officer’s inaction may be indirect and obscure. Moreover, officers with discretionary authority, such as prosecutors, are protected from liability by
the absence of any legally enforceable duty to act. In consequence, the risk of being
sued for erroneous or improper action is vastly greater than is the risk of being sued
for erroneous or improper (and perhaps equally costly) inaction. This imbalance increases the incentive to protect oneself by doing less.”).
323. As Douglas Laycock said in his critique of the irreparable injury rule,
“[b]ecause damages are almost never adequate, injury is almost always irreparable. . . .
Plaintiffs cannot replace defective body parts, and awards for pain and suffering do not
make the pain go away.” Douglas Laycock, The Death of the Irreparable Injury Rule, 103
HARV. L. REV. 687, 702, 709 (1990). Social science research also demonstrates as much.
See, e.g., Jefferey C. Schneider, Nhi-Ha T. Trinh, Elizabeth Selleck, Felipe Fregni, Sara S.
Salles, Collen M. Ryan & Joel Stein, The Long-Term Impact of Physical and Emotional
Trauma: The Station Nightclub Fire, PLOS ONE, Oct. 2012, at 1, 6 (comparing the effects
of emotional and physical trauma on fire victims and concluding that “[s]urvivors
[who] experienced physical and emotional trauma (those with burn injuries) demonstrate the same outcomes as those that experienced emotional trauma alone (those
without burn injuries). Our analysis suggests that non-physical trauma is the primary
determinant of these outcomes [including post-traumatic stress and depression].”);
see also City of Riverside v. Rivera, 477 U.S. 561, 562 (1986) (“Unlike most private tort
litigants, a civil rights plaintiff seeks to vindicate important civil and constitutional
rights that cannot be valued solely in monetary terms.”).
324. See Riverside, 477 U.S. at 574 (“‘[T]he public as a whole has an interest in the
vindication of the rights conferred by [civil rights statutes] . . . over and above the value
of a civil rights remedy to a particular plaintiff. . . .’ Regardless of the form of relief he
actually obtains, a successful civil rights plaintiff often secures important social benefits that are not reflected in nominal or relatively small damages awards.” (quoting
Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 444 n.4 (1983))).
325. Id. at 575 (“In addition, the damages a plaintiff recovers contributes significantly to the deterrence of civil rights violations in the future.”). Myriam Gilles describes these effects as “fault-fixing functions” in the municipal liability context. Myriam E. Gilles, In Defense of Making Government Pay: The Deterrent Effect of
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who have questioned money damages as a vehicle for structural reform in some contexts acknowledge that a damages remedy can motivate such reforms in others.326 They point out that when there is a correspondence between the prohibited misconduct and the injury
suffered, damages can promote structural reforms.327 The sexual harassment and assault that Title IX prohibits corresponds directly to the
injury suffered.328 Strengthening the availability of a damages remedy
under Title IX, therefore, holds very real promise of prompting structural reforms in schools when they respond vacuously to student sexual harassment.329
Importantly, although the proposals here aim to achieve both
structural and individual claims-based reforms, they are still modest.
They do not call for a radical overhaul of the standard for evaluating
Title IX claims established by the Supreme Court.330 Instead, they offer
a way to more firmly marry the full potential of the deliberate indifference standard as explained by the Supreme Court to its evaluation.331 Despite their relative restraint, these proposals are not without potential critiques.332 Because those critiques could apply to all
the proposals made here, they will be addressed in the final Section.

Constitutional Tort Remedies, 35 GA. L. REV. 845, 862 (2001). She argues that “municipal
liability claims serve a ‘fault-fixing’ function, localizing culpability in the municipality
itself, and forcing municipal policymakers to consider reformative measures.” Id. at
861.
326. See, e.g., John C. Jeffries, Jr. & George A. Rutherglen, Structural Reform Revisited, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 1387, 1405 (2007) (“[O]ne can say that money damages are more
likely to prove effective when the harm to be compensated is injury of the sort that the
particular constitutional guarantee was intended to prevent. That would be true, for
example, in excessive force cases, where the physical consequences of excessive force
are precisely what constitutional doctrine attempts to prevent . . . [as opposed to] an
ordinary case of illegal search that discovers incriminating evidence leading to trial,
conviction, and punishment. In a but-for sense, all of these harms flow from the illegal
search, yet few would contemplate reimbursing the victim for the consequences of his
or her own criminality.”).
327. See id.; supra text accompanying note 326.
328. See Davis v. Monroe Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 650 (1999) (finding that
student-on-student sexual harassment is capable of triggering a damages claim under
Title IX and noting that “[h]aving previously determined that ‘sexual harassment’ is
‘discrimination’ in the school context under Title IX, we are constrained to conclude
that student-on-student sexual harassment, if sufficiently severe can likewise rise to
the level of discrimination actionable under the statute”).
329. See supra notes 324–26 and accompanying text (noting the social benefit and
“fault-fixing” function of damages suits that arise from civil rights issues).
330. See infra Part III.A.
331. See infra Part III.A.
332. See infra Part III.D.
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A. RECASTING DELIBERATE INDIFFERENCE AND A FRAMEWORK FOR ITS
ASSESSMENT
In the current analysis, the lower courts divorce the complete
meaning of the deliberate indifference standard from their evaluations of it and thereby strip Title IX of its power to protect students.333
The deliberate indifference standard, therefore, needs to explicitly demand the affirmative protection it now only implicitly requires.334 It
should mandate that upon notice of student sexual harassment,
schools must take affirmative steps to protect against causing or even
just putting students at risk for further harassment.335 Under this refined standard, a clearly unreasonable response to known sexual harassment would be one that failed to take such affirmative measures
and so either caused students’ continued sexual harassment or put
them at risk for it such that they lost educational benefits.336
To evaluate this revised standard, courts need operative descriptions of what it means to affirmatively protect students in these ways.
333. See supra Parts I.D, II.B.2 (explaining the risk of further harm that is imposed
on students under the current standard of review).
334. See supra notes 58–60 and accompanying text (discussing the protections
that Title IX is intended to afford to students).
335. This standard is triggered on notice of an instance of harassment, which is
itself a standard in need of revision. The extraordinary particularity required under
the courts’ assessments of Title IX’s actual notice requirement creates almost impossible hurdles for students to overcome. See supra note 203 and accompanying text. The
proposals I have made previously to remedy the problems with the actual notice prong
of the Title IX test work in conjunction with the proposals made here. See supra note
203 and accompanying text; see also MacKinnon, supra note 17, at 2069 (“The lack of
effectiveness and absence of realism of the deliberate indifference standard begin with
the requisite notice. . . . [T]he contours of the knowledge required for Title IX liability
[are] not notable for transparency or consistency.”).
336. At least two federal courts of appeals, the Court of Appeals for the First and
Eleventh Circuits, have articulated a standard approximating the one proposed here,
without, however, any explicit articulation of an affirmative duty on the part of schools
to protect students from known sexual harassment. See Hill v. Cundiff, 797 F.3d 948,
973 (11th Cir. 2015); Fitzgerald v. Barnstable Sch. Comm., 504 F.3d 165, 172–73 (1st
Cir. 2007) (noting that deliberate indifference can take “the form of a failure to take
any precautions that would prevent future attacks,” but finding that the facts of the
case negated the claim of deliberate indifference (quoting Williams v. Bd. of Regents,
477 F.3d 1282, 1297 (11th Cir. 2007))); supra note 231 and accompanying text. While
the First Circuit did not find that the institution’s response in question was so deficient
as to be unreasonable, the Eleventh Circuit did and found facts sufficient to make out
a Title IX claim. Fitzgerald, 504 F.3d at 174; Hill, 797 F.3d at 975. In Hill v. Cundiff, the
court said that a “clearly unreasonable response causes students to undergo harassment or makes them more vulnerable to it.” 797 F.3d at 973. Although it then found
facts sufficient to satisfy the standard, the facts were so outrageous—involving the
school using a student as rape bait—that it is difficult to extrapolate to even slightly
less egregious facts. Id. at 975; see supra note 210 and accompanying text.
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First, courts should evaluate schools’ responses to student sexual harassment and assault to determine whether they are reasonably designed to protect students against risking or causing more harassment. Absent such reasonable design, schools’ responses are
inadequate to the task of preventing or addressing further sexual harassment and so do not affirmatively protect against it. 337 Second,
courts should evaluate any non-action by schools to reported sexual
harassment as a categorical failure to take affirmative action to protect against students’ suffering further harassment and so as not reasonably designed. Courts, therefore, should find any such non-action
categorically clearly unreasonable and deliberate. Third, courts
should also categorically conclude that schools’ responses to sexual
harassment that blame and punish survivors are also not reasonably
designed to affirmatively protect against sexual harassment. They too,
then, should be found clearly unreasonable and deliberately indifferent.
1. Assessing for Reasonably Designed Responses to Sexual
Harassment
The Supreme Court said in Gebser v. Lago Vista Independent
School District that schools act with deliberate indifference when they
“ha[ve] actual knowledge of discrimination . . . and fail[] adequately to
respond.”338 Yet, the Court did not offer guidance on precisely what
constitutes an inadequate response.339 If the deliberate indifference
standard explicitly requires schools to affirmatively protect students
from risking or causing additional sexual harassment, as proposed
here, then a school’s response to any report of student sexual harassment is inadequate when it fails to affirmatively protect students in
these ways. Taken further, if a school’s response to student sexual harassment is not reasonably designed to protect them from further harassment, or if it indirectly causes more harassment, the response is
337. See supra Parts I.A, I.D.2.
338. 524 U.S. 274, 290 (1998). The § 1983 cases the Supreme Court draws on in
establishing the deliberate indifference standard in Title IX claims also describe deliberate indifference as occurring by inadequate responses. City of Canton v. Harris, 489
U.S. 378, 390 (1989) (“The issue in a case like this one, however, is whether that training program is adequate . . . . [I]t may happen that in light of the duties assigned to specific officers or employees the need for more or different training is so obvious, and
the inadequacy so likely to result in the violation of constitutional rights, that the policymakers of the city can reasonably be said to have been deliberately indifferent to the
need.”); see also Brake, supra note 73, at 14 (“The remaining component of the standard measures the objective adequacy of the school’s response to the harassment.”).
339. See Gebser, 524 U.S. at 290–93.
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inadequate and therefore clearly unreasonable and deliberately indifferent.340
First, factors for assessing such a reasonable design should include inquiring into whether the school made reasonable efforts to
identify the source of the problem and address it. Only once the source
of the problem is discovered can the school’s intervention truly be
aimed at preventing further harassment. The source of the problem
could be individual, as was likely the case in Gabrielle M. v. Park ForestChicago Heights. In that case, kindergartner Gabrielle M. was assaulted
by another kindergartner, who, chances are, had been victimized himself. 341 Alternatively, the source of the problem could be a broader
school climate issue, as seemingly was the case in Stiles v. Grainger
County, where a middle school student, D.S., suffered repeated harassment over two school years by over ten students.342
Once a school has made reasonable efforts to determine the
source of the problem, its response should be reasonably designed to
address the source. The response, therefore, might need to be individual, systemic, or both. Either way, the response must be fully implemented. Otherwise, it stands to lose features that render it reasonably
designed. For example, in Gabrielle M., because the student who harassed Gabrielle M. was also a kindergartner, he likely suffered abuse
himself.343 A reasonable response to Gabrielle M.’s harassment, therefore, would include uncovering and addressing her harasser’s likely
abuse. Such an individually-focused response alone, however, would
not suffice to address a larger school climate problem as in Stiles,
where D.S. suffered repeated harassment over two school years by
more than ten different students.344 In such cases, a school would have
to address broader school climate concerns for the school’s response
to be reasonably designed.345
340. Elsewhere, I have broadly proposed that deliberate indifference be evaluated
based on reasonableness. Suski, supra note 17, at 774 (“[I]nstead of evaluating deliberate indifference by inquiring into whether a school’s response was not clearly unreasonable, courts should ask whether a school acted reasonably.”). The recommendations here are in keeping with that recommendation but refine it to propose the
reasonableness of the response be an evaluation of reasonable design.
341. See Gabrielle M. v. Park Forest-Chi. Heights Sch. Dist. 163, 315 F.3d 817, 818–
20 (7th Cir. 2003); see supra note 310 and accompanying text.
342. See Stiles ex rel. D.S. v. Grainger Cnty., 819 F.3d 834, 841–45 (6th Cir. 2016).
343. See supra note 341 and accompanying text.
344. Repeated harassment spoke to a larger problem where it was acceptable, possibly even socially advantageous, for students to harass D.S. See Stiles, 819 F.3d at 841–
45.
345. See id. Such school-wide programs already exist and have been evaluated by
social science research as effective. The Positive Behavioral Interventions and
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Finally, to prevent continuing trauma related to the sexual harassment, schools’ responses need to seek to ameliorate these effects
in order to be reasonably designed. These effects often include mental
health and emotional trauma. 346 To be reasonably designed, therefore, interventions should include connecting students with counseling or other efforts to address the harm of the harassment when those
harms exist.347
Importantly, the evaluation of an adequate, reasonably designed
response is not an assessment of a response’s effectiveness.348 A well
Supports, or PBIS, model is one such model that can address bullying, among other
problem behaviors in school, on a school-wide basis. See, e.g., Catherine P. Bradshaw,
Tracy E. Waasdorp & Philip J. Leaf, Effects of School-Wide Positive Behavioral Interventions and Supports on Child Behavior Problems, 130 PEDIATRICS e1136, e1136 (2012)
(“Children in [school-wide positive behavioral interventions and supports (SWPBIS)]
schools also were 33% less likely to receive an office discipline referral than those in
the comparison schools. The effects tended to be strongest among children who were
first exposed to SWPBIS in kindergarten.”).
346. See, e.g., Jim Duffy, Stacey Wareham & Margaret Walsh, Psychological Consequences for High School Students of Having Been Sexually Harassed, 50 SEX ROLES 811,
818–21 (2004) (discussing the negative psychological and academic impact of sexual
harassment on high school students); HILL & KEARL, supra note 44, at 28 (“Most students who experienced sexual harassment felt that it had a negative effect on them.
Many students said that they felt sick to their stomach or had trouble sleeping. Some
students had trouble concentrating on their homework, and others said that they
missed class, quit a school activity, or changed schools.”).
347. For example, student K.S. suffered a severe depressive disorder related to the
sexual harassment he suffered in middle school. K.S. v. Nw. Indep. Sch. Dist., 689 F.
App’x 780, 782 (5th Cir. 2017). The harassment exacerbated his symptoms and contributed to K.S.’s suicide attempt. See supra notes 200–01 and accompanying text. In a
similar case, a middle school student, K.C., also “suffered an acute psychotic episode
that required hospitalization” following repeated sexual harassment and assault. Rost
ex rel. K.C. v. Steamboat Springs RE-2 Sch. Dist., 511 F.3d 1114, 1118 (10th Cir. 2008).
348. The one-time use of an ineffective response does not in and of itself prove the
response was inadequate. However, if a school continues to use that unavailing response, then that continued use does demonstrate that the school used an inadequate
response that indirectly causes sexual harassment and assault. See supra Part I.D.3.
Again, this form of indirect causation finds its origins in § 1983 actions. See Bryan Cnty.
Bd. of Comm’rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 407 (1997) (rejecting a claim that failure to
screen one employee in hiring constituted a sufficient basis for municipal liability under § 1983 but still noting that “[i]f a program does not prevent constitutional violations, municipal decisionmakers may eventually be put on notice that a new program
is called for. Their continued adherence to an approach that they know or should know
has failed to prevent tortious conduct by employees may establish the conscious disregard for the consequences of their action—the ‘deliberate indifference’—necessary
to trigger municipal liability.”); see also Patterson v. Hudson Area Schs., 551 F.3d 438,
439 (6th Cir. 2009) (finding that there was a genuine issue of material fact as to
whether the school was deliberately indifferent to the student-on-student sexual harassment at issue); Vance v. Spencer Cnty. Sch. Dist., 231 F.3d 253, 256–64 (6th Cir.
2000) (holding that a sixth grader had established sufficient evidence that the school
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designed, more than adequate response could still fail. It is easy to imagine a scenario in which a school, upon learning of a student’s sexual
harassment, implements an intervention both designed to address the
root of the problem and its effects on the student suffering the harassment, but the harassment continues. 349 For example, in Stiles, the
school could have determined that the source of D.S.’s ongoing harassment did involve a school climate problem that allowed or even supported D.S.’s multiple years of repeated harassment by many different
students.350 It consequently could have also determined that elements
of the school climate that contributed to that overall problem required
school-wide training for teachers and students. A part of that training
could have included explicit communication about the school’s intolerance for such behavior as well as targeted individual training and
counseling for the students who had harassed D.S. Further, such interventions could have addressed the negative psychological effects on
D.S. by providing him counseling, the option of a school transfer to
avoid seeing the students who harassed him, or both. Yet, despite such
meaningfully designed interventions, a student, for example, could
still find D.S. at a school sporting event and harass him. The fact that
the reasonably designed interventions did not prevent that harassment does not negate their reasonableness and so would not demonstrate deliberate indifference. Thus, this inquiry into what constitutes

board was deliberately indifferent to her sexual harassment); supra note 103 and accompanying text.
349. Inadequate responses as conceptualized here also do not turn on negligence
or whether a school could have done more. See City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378,
391–92 (1989) (“To adopt lesser standards of fault and causation would open municipalities to unprecedented liability under § 1983. In virtually every instance where a
person has had his or her constitutional rights violated by a city employee, a § 1983
plaintiff will be able to point to something the city ‘could have done’ to prevent the
unfortunate incident. Thus, permitting cases against cities for their ‘failure to train’
employees to go forward under § 1983 on a lesser standard of fault would result in de
facto respondeat superior liability on municipalities—a result we rejected in Monell. It
would also engage the federal courts in an endless exercise of second-guessing municipal employee-training programs. This is an exercise we believe the federal courts are
ill suited to undertake, as well as one that would implicate serious questions of federalism.” (citations omitted)). A school could always do more, even when its approaches
to dealing with sexual harassment are effective. Instead, the adequacy determination
here examines the design of the approach. As such, it is a narrower inquiry than
whether a school could have reasonably done more. That said, scholars as thoughtful
and serious about Title IX’s flaws as Catharine MacKinnon have made compelling arguments for something like a reasonableness standard. MacKinnon, supra note 17, at
2096–97 (calling for a due diligence standard to supplant the deliberate indifference
standard in Title IX claims).
350. See Stiles ex rel. D.S. v. Grainger Cnty., 819 F.3d 834, 841–45 (6th Cir. 2016).
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a reasonably designed response is both necessary to ensuring the affirmative protections posited here and necessarily case-specific.
2. Categorically Precluding Any Non-Response to Student Sexual
Harassment
Under this revised framework, certain types of responses to student sexual harassment are categorically clearly unreasonable and deliberately indifferent. A one-time instance of non-action by schools to
a report of student sexual harassment is not designed at all, let alone
reasonably, to protect against risking or causing students further harassment.351 Courts should therefore find that even a one-time failure
by schools to respond to known student sexual harassment is a failure
to affirmatively act to protect students. Courts should categorically
conclude such non-responses are clearly unreasonable and deliberately indifferent. 352 Such a categorical prohibition on inaction by
schools would, as with the reasonable design framework itself, not require specific actions, but it would require schools to do something
reasonably designed to address student harassment. The objective
here is to compel some response by the schools to every report of student sexual harassment, where the law now allows schools to intermittently do nothing.353 By prohibiting any non-response by schools
to reports of sexual harassment in this way, the courts could no longer
use a school’s occasional response to sexual harassment to inoculate
their other non-responses to it.354
Significantly, identifying this category of responses, or non-responses, as sufficient to establish deliberate indifference finds footing
in the Supreme Court Title IX jurisprudence. In Davis, the Court said
that when schools “refuse[] to take action,”355 “remain idle,”356 or decide “not to remedy the violation,” they have acted with deliberate indifference. 357 The Court did not limit this prohibition on non351. See supra Part I.D.1 (discussing how non-response to sexual harassment puts
students at risk for future harassment).
352. Importantly, because students need to show that their sexual harassment was
severe and pervasive to have a viable Title IX claim, if a school fails to respond to a
minor incident of sexual harassment, for example, the claim will still not prevail. See
Davis v. Monroe Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 631 (1999) (explaining that the sexual
harassment must be “sufficiently severe” to rise to the level of “discrimination” actionable under Title IX); supra note 65 and accompanying text.
353. See supra Part I.A.
354. See supra Part I.A.
355. Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 290 (1998).
356. Davis, 526 U.S. at 641.
357. Gebser, 524 U.S. at 290.
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responses to schools’ complete and total failures to respond.358 When
a school fails to act in response to a report of student sexual harassment, therefore, it puts the student at risk for, or indirectly causes, or
both, the student’s further sexual harassment.
3. Categorically Precluding Responses to Student Sexual
Harassment that Cause Secondary Harms and Institutional Betrayals
Finally, schools’ inverted responses to student sexual harassment
that inflict secondary harms and institutional betrayals on students do
the opposite of affirmatively protecting them. Courts, therefore,
should categorically conclude that schools’ responses that inflict secondary trauma or institutional betrayals are clearly unreasonable responses under this framework. These harms happen when schools
blame the survivor, including by suggesting the survivor could have
done something to stop, change, or prevent the harassment.359 They
also occur when schools respond to student sexual harassment by effectively punishing the survivors.360 Consequently, courts should find
any school response to student sexual harassment that causes these
harms transgresses this revised deliberate indifference standard.
4. Changed Outcomes
Under this revised standard and framework for determining deliberate indifference, the outcomes of cases such as Rost ex rel. K.C. v.
Steamboat Springs, 361 Gabrielle M. v. Forest Park-Chicago Heights, 362
and K.F. ex rel. C.F. v. Monroe Woodbury Central School District would
change.363 Because a school could no longer merely make a referral to
law enforcement but do nothing in the school setting to address the
sexual harassment and assault that middle school student K.C. suffered, that non-response would violate the deliberate indifference
standard. 364 Likewise, although kindergartner Gabrielle M.’s school
did not fail to intervene in response to her harassment by another kindergarten student, its decision to intervene by separating Gabrielle
from her abuser but then not fully implementing that response would

358. See id. (comparing deliberate indifference to “an official decision . . . not to
remedy the violation”).
359. See supra notes 135, 139, 194–95, 197, 200–01 and accompanying text.
360. See supra notes 135, 139, 194–95, 197, 200–01 and accompanying text.
361. 511 F.3d 1114 (10th Cir. 2008).
362. 315 F.3d 817 (7th Cir. 2003).
363. 531 F. App’x 132 (2d Cir. 2013).
364. See Rost, 511 F.3d at 1114, 1117–18.
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not satisfy the reasonable design requirement.365 It would fail on that
count because even if the response could be called reasonably designed to address the source of the harassment, the fact that it was not
fully implemented means its implementation eliminated elements of
its reasonable design. 366 It therefore was inadequate to the task of
protecting Gabrielle.367 Finally, when the school responded to student
C.F.’s harassment by offering her a disciplinary school placement, effectively punishing her for her own harassment and so meting out secondary trauma and institutional betrayals, this response would be categorically clearly unreasonable. 368 Consequently, it too would
contravene the revised deliberate indifference standard and violate
Title IX.
B. A PRESUMPTION OF DELIBERATE INDIFFERENCE
One goal underlying these recommended changes is to prompt
schools to meaningfully consider how to respond to student sexual
harassment in order to protect against and address it. Achieving such
meaningful responses would do substantial work to accomplish Title
IX’s purpose of protecting students from sexual harassment in the
public schools.369 A new legal presumption in Title IX cases aimed at
schools’ repeated use of failed responses to student sexual harassment would further that goal.370 Under this presumption, if a student
could demonstrate that a school repeated a failed intervention in response to sexual harassment, such evidence would create the presumption of deliberate indifference. The burden of proof would shift
to the school to either disprove the repetition of that response or to
demonstrate that it had a reasonable justification for repeating the response at the time it did so.
The fact of repeating a failed response is critical to this presumption. Because a reasonably designed response can still fail to protect
365. 315 F.3d at 820–21.
366. See id. at 820 (explaining that the school failed to ensure that Jason was completely separated from Gabrielle or that the harassment had stopped).
367. See id.; supra Part III.A.2.
368. K.F., 531 F. App’x at 133.
369. See supra Part I.A; supra note 60 and accompanying text.
370. See supra note 348 and accompanying text. In both Doe v. Board of Education
and McCoy v. Board of Education, for example, both elementary schools’ repeated use
of responses—talking and issuing a letter of reprimand, respectively, to the accused
harasser—did not stop student sexual harassment and abuse. Doe, 605 F. App’x 159,
161–62 (4th Cir. 2015); McCoy, 515 F. App’x 387, 389 (6th Cir. 2013). The students
suffered more harassment after the school repeated those ineffective responses. Doe,
605 F. App’x at 161–63; McCoy, 515 F. App’x at 389.
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against sexual harassment, the fact of its initial failure does not
demonstrate that the response is deliberately indifferent.371 The continued use of that response, though, does support such a finding. Once
a school knows that its response to sexual harassment has failed to
prevent more sexual harassment, its reuse of that same response
holds little hope of preventing or addressing the sexual harassment.372
The repeated implementation of failed responses to student sexual
harassment therefore puts students at risk for and can indirectly
cause more harassment.373 They therefore should be presumptively
deemed clearly unreasonable and deliberately indifferent.
More specifically, to have the benefit of this presumption, a student would need to make three showings. First, the student would
have to demonstrate evidence of the school’s initial response to the
student’s report of sexual harassment. Then, the student would have
to show that she or he suffered more sexual harassment after the implementation of that response and the school knew about it.374 Third,
the student would then have to show that the school repeated that
failed intervention again.
Upon making these three showings, the school would also be presumed to be deliberately indifferent. It could, however, rebut the presumption in one of two ways. First, it could rebut the presumption
with evidence disproving its repeated use of that failed response. To
do so, a school could not just show a small difference in the responses
used but a difference in the kind or magnitude of the responses. For
example, in Porto v. Town of Tewksbury, the school could not rebut this
presumption of deliberate indifference by showing that it separated
S.C. and R.C. on the bus and in the classroom because such separations
are not different in kind or magnitude.375
Second, a school could rebut the presumption of deliberate indifference by showing that it had a reasonable justification for repeating
its failed response at the time it reimplemented the failed response.
To establish such a reasonable justification, the school would first
have to produce evidence to demonstrate that it considered
371. See supra notes 348–49 and accompanying text.
372. See Bryan Cnty. Bd. of Comm’rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 407 (1997) (“Their
continued adherence to an approach that they know or should know has failed to prevent tortious conduct by employees may establish the conscious disregard for the consequences of their action—the ‘deliberate indifference’—necessary to trigger municipal liability.”).
373. See supra Parts I.B, I.D.1; supra note 348 and accompanying text.
374. It bears repeating that what constitutes notice is currently highly specific and
problematic. See supra note 203 and accompanying text.
375. See Porto v. Town of Tewksbury, 488 F.3d 67, 70–71 (1st Cir. 2007).
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alternatives to the failed response at the time it decided to use the
failed response again. Then, it would have to show that it had a reasonable basis for reusing the failed response at the time it decided to
reuse it. Those alternatives and that reasonable basis would show that
the school did not unthinkingly apply the same failed intervention
again. Only after making both showings could a school successfully rebut the presumption of deliberate indifference. For example, a school
might be able to rebut the presumption of deliberate indifference by
showing that because of the child’s young age, the repetition of some
specific response was necessary because young children do not learn
without such repetition. The school could further produce evidence
that it therefore repeated the intervention because, at the time it did
so, the school sought to reinforce earlier messages about the wrongs
of inappropriate touching before implementing more drastic interventions, again given the child’s young age. Such showings would establish a reasonable basis for the repeated use of the failed response
and therefore would rebut the presumption of deliberate indifference.
This proposed legal presumption, like the standard and framework it serves, would change the outcomes in some Title IX cases. For
example, in Porto, after the elementary school learned that student
R.C. harassed and assaulted S.C., the school repeatedly separated the
boys’ classroom seats in addition to separating them on the bus. 376
The repetition of this failed physical separation response would trigger the presumption of deliberate indifference. 377 Absent any evidence to rebut the proof of the intervention’s repetition, the school’s
consideration of alternative interventions, or a reasonable justification for its repeated use of those physical separations, the court would
be constrained to find that the school acted with deliberate indifference. 378 This presumption, coupled with the inquiry into whether
schools’ responses to sexual harassment are reasonably designed to
protect students from further harassment, would not only upend the
lower courts’ subversion of the deliberate indifference standard but
would also offer students significant recourse in Title IX when schools
failed to provide the protections it demands.

376. Id.
377. Id.
378. Although the school district challenged the sufficiency of some of the evidence
presented at the district court level, it did not include evidence presented on its repeated responses to the harassment in that challenge. See Porto ex rel. SC v. Town of
Tewksbury, No. 04-10003, 2006 WL 1167782 (D. Mass. Apr. 28, 2006), rev’d sub nom.
Porto v. Town of Tewksbury, 488 F.3d 67 (1st Cir. 2007). The school district, therefore,
could not have rebutted the presumption on that basis. See id.
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C. A TITLE IX REGULATORY OPPORTUNITY
Title IX’s protections do not depend solely on the courts for their
enforcement. Title IX has a regulatory scheme for its public enforcement by the U.S. Department of Education that can work in conjunction with its private enforcement system in the courts. 379 Although
those regulations were just revised,380 the change in presidential administrations offers the possibility that those regulations will be revised yet again.381 Thus, the opportunity exists to amend the Title IX
regulations such that they include provisions to better ensure schools
will protect students from and address their harassment.382 The regulations therefore should incorporate a requirement that schools
379. 34 C.F.R. §§ 106.1–.71 (2020).
380. Id. §§ 106.1–.82.
381. During his campaign for president, President Biden vowed a “quick end” to
the new Title IX regulations. Michael Stratfor, The Biden Agenda: For His Tuition-Free
College Plans and More Money for Poor School Districts, Biden Needs Congress on Board,
POLITICO (Nov. 7, 2020), https://www.politico.com/news/2020/11/07/joe-biden
-policies-education-433633 [https://perma.cc/4WVR-VPV5].
382. In the fall of 2018, the U.S. Department of Education proposed new regulations for its public enforcement of Title IX, which have not yet been made final. Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Sex in Education Programs or Activities Receiving Federal Financial Assistance, 83 Fed. Reg. 61,408, 61,433–66 (proposed Nov. 29, 2018).
The proposed regulations received strong criticism. See, e.g., Nancy Chi Cantalupo, Dog
Whistles and Beachheads: The Trump Administration, Sexual Violence and Student Discipline in Education, 54 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 303, 311 (2019) (arguing that the changes
to standards under the proposed Title IX rules constitute an “attempt to replace the
historically used civil rights preponderance standard with the quasi-criminal C&C
[clear and convincing] evidence standard” and is part of a “larger and longer war
against civil rights and equal educational opportunity”); Janet Napolitano, Don’t Let the
Trump Administration Undermine Title IX, WASH. POST (Dec. 4, 2018), https://www
.washingtonpost.com/opinions/janet-napolitano-don’t-let-the-trump-administration
-undermine-title-ix/2018/12/04/6c91f316-f7fc-11e8-863c-9e2f864d47e7_story
.html [https://perma.cc/U85E-4XET] (“The Education Department’s proposed rules
threaten to reverse this hard-won progress by unraveling critical protections for individuals who are sexually harassed and undermining the very procedures designed to
ensure fairness and justice.”). That said, some advocates criticize the current standards
and support the proposed changes. E.g., Janet Halley, Trading the Megaphone for the
Gavel in Title IX Enforcement, 128 HARV. L. REV. F. 103, 115 (2015) (describing the “dangers of an unthinkingly broad, advocacy-based definition of sexual harassment”); Lara
Bazelon, I’m a Democrat and a Feminist. I Support Betsy DeVos’s Title IX Reforms, N.Y.
TIMES (Dec. 4, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/04/opinion/-title-ix-devos
-democrat-feminist.html [https://perma.cc/H9VE-B33A] (arguing that racial implications of the current standards demand reform and noting that “[w]e have long oversexualized, over-criminalized and disproportionately punished black men. It should
come as no surprise that, in [the Title IX enforcement] setting in which protections for
the accused are greatly diminished, this shameful legacy persists.”). Despite the many
serious concerns that the proposed Title IX regulations give rise to, because they are
not yet final, they may still be amended.
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develop written plans detailing their responses to known student sexual harassment. The requirement that schools develop these written
plans would help prompt schools to develop reasonably designed responses to reports of student sexual harassment. Such a change to the
Title IX regulations would thus work in conjunction with and support
both the deliberate indifference framework and presumption proposed here.
Such plans are not legal novelties. Other civil rights laws require
schools to develop written plans, including, prominently, the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA).383 The Title IX regulations,
like the IDEA, should mandate that schools develop a written plan
upon a report of a student’s sexual harassment. The schools should be
required to identify the source of the problem in the plan and how
they will address it in a manner that is reasonably designed to protect
against its recurrence and ameliorate its effects. Further, the regulations should require that the school revise the plan as soon as possible
after receiving notice that an intervention did not work to avoid the
immediate risk of further sexual harassment.384 These changes would
strengthen both the private and public enforcement schemes by demanding meaningful, reasonably designed, consistent responses to
every report of student sexual harassment.
D. CRITIQUES AND THEIR ANSWERS
Virtually any time a public system’s potential for liability increases, so do concerns about moral hazard and informational error
costs. 385 Proposals that require schools to take on more
383. See 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.320, .323 (2007) (defining written individualized education plans for students with disabilities and mandating that they be in effect for each
child with a disability in a school district). Further, these proposed requirements could
also trigger the discovery of disabilities under the IDEA’s child find requirements and
consequently the provision of needed special education and related services to some
students. Id. §§ 300.111 (child find requirements), .101 (free appropriate public education requirements).
384. Although the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act requires that written
IEPs be in effect for students with disabilities and that they include services that allow
a child to make appropriate progress toward annual goals, it does not expressly preclude a school from repeating those goals and services year after year. See id.
§ 300.320. Advocates for students with disabilities who see their goals and services
repeated year after year without change or progress, therefore, have to argue that the
IEPs are not designed to make such progress. See id. That conclusion is not a given. See
id.
385. The Davis dissent, for example, was explicit in its concerns about effecting a
sort of moral hazard with the imposition of Title IX liability for peer sexual harassment,
arguing that “[t]he cost of defending against peer sexual harassment suits alone could
overwhelm many school districts . . . . A school faced with a peer sexual harassment
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administrative efforts also raise concerns about the burdens placed
on schools. 386 Because the recommendations here would both increase the potential for school liability and add administrative requirements, all of these concerns apply to the proposals made here,
are serious, and warrant answers.387
Increasing schools’ Title IX liability could generate a sort of moral
hazard if it provided recompense, however inadequate,388 to an individual student at the cost of diminishing the resources available to the
broader population of students in that school district.389 Such a moral
hazard might occur if the damages award left the school district with
fewer resources to serve its population of students more generally.390
Increased Title IX liability, however, has a relatively small likelihood of causing any such moral hazard for reasons based in lossspreading principles. Loss-spreading principles seek to “identify the
actors in the risk-producing transaction who, regardless of fault, are
best suited institutionally to manage the loss.”391 Sometimes the institution or actor at fault is best equipped to bear that loss.392 Such is the
complaint . . . may well be beset with litigation from every side.” Davis v. Monroe Cnty.
Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 680, 682 (1999) (Kennedy, J., dissenting). The Davis dissent,
however, was incorrect in these predictions. See Suski, supra note 17.
386. See supra Part III.C.
387. I have addressed several of these same or similar critiques in previous scholarship on Title IX and public schools’ liability more generally for harms to children. See
Suski, supra note 17; supra note 203 and accompanying text. Because they are not insignificant and could be made here, they merit addressing.
388. See supra note 323 and accompanying text.
389. Tom Baker has defined a moral hazard as “the perverse consequences of wellintentioned efforts to share the burdens of life.” Tom Baker, On the Genealogy of Moral
Hazard, 75 TEX. L. REV. 237, 239 (1996). In the insurance regulation context, John Rappaport has explained moral hazard as “the propensity of insurance to reduce the insured’s incentive to prevent harm.” John Rappaport, How Private Insurers Regulate
Public Police, 130 HARV. L. REV. 1539, 1543 (2017). Although a classic moral hazard
may be thought of as occurring in circumstances such as when fire insurance coverage
causes the insured to act carelessly with regard to fire hazards, Baker generalizes the
concept, explaining that it occurs “any time that one party’s actions have consequences
for the risk of loss borne by another.” Baker, supra, at 272.
390. See Baker, supra note 389 and accompanying text; Rappaport, supra note 389
and accompanying text.
391. John A. Siliciano, Negligent Accounting and the Limits of Instrumental Tort Reform, 86 MICH. L. REV. 1929, 1969 (1988) (examining the validity of loss-spreading concepts in tort).
392. See id. at 1977–78 (“[T]o the extent that loss spreading is accepted as a rationale, the product manufacturer is generally considered to be better equipped than
the individual consumer to manage and spread accident costs . . . . [T]hese portrayals
seem appropriate, and thus instrumental theory works in harmony with intuitive notions of the just outcome.”); see also Robert L. Rabin, Tort Recovery for Negligently
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case in the Title IX context. As compared to schools, individual students have little capacity to bear the loss of their education and psychological and physical well-being.393 First, schools are institutionally
designed to educate students.394 So they are far better suited than students to remedy any educational losses students might suffer as a result of sexual harassment.395 Second, compared to the majority of public school students, schools have the resources to address or pay to
address the psychological and other effects of sexual harassment.396
In any event, schools’ resources are not likely to be stretched to the
point of creating a moral hazard because many carry insurance to help
offset the burden of such liability.397
Inflicted Economic Loss: A Reassessment, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1513, 1520–21 (1985) (arguing that “[a]ttorneys are better able to spread the cost of careless lawyering than random victim-beneficiaries who do not constitute an activity category for risk-spreading
purposes. At the same time, a rule of liability can be justified from an economic efficiency perspective: Acknowledging liability creates an incentive to take greater care—
what the court referred to as ‘the social policy of preventing future harm.’” (quoting
Heyer v. Flaig, 449 P.2d 161, 165 (Cal. 1969))).
393. See supra Part I.D; infra note 396 and accompanying text.
394. That is their purpose for being. E.g., Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589,
603 (1967) (“The classroom is peculiarly the ‘marketplace of ideas.’ The Nation’s future depends upon leaders trained through wide exposure to that robust exchange of
ideas which discovers truth ‘out of a multitude of tongues, [rather] than through any
kind of authoritative selection.’” (quoting United States v. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp.
362, 372 (S.D.N.Y. 1943))). Further, Michael Wells’s argument that the constitutional
tort context especially merits application of civil recourse principles has cogency here.
Michael L. Wells, Civil Recourse, Damages-as-Redress, and Constitutional Torts, 46 GA. L.
REV. 1003, 1051–52 (2012). He contends that “the force of the argument for civil recourse norms is magnified in the constitutional tort context because the rights asserted are more vital and the defendants from whom redress is sought are more powerful and more dangerous.” Id. at 1012. Given that Title IX operates to fill a gap left by
the failure of federal and state common law to fully prevent discrimination on the basis
of sex in schools, the rights enforced by Title IX are just as forceful as those enforced
by constitutional torts.
395. See Keyishian, 385 U.S. at 603; Wells, supra note 394 and accompanying text.
396. More than half of the public-school population lives in poverty. A 2015 report
by the Southern Education Foundation found that 51% of students in the public
schools live in poverty. S. EDUC. FOUND., A NEW MAJORITY: LOW INCOME STUDENTS NOW A
MAJORITY IN THE NATION’S PUBLIC SCHOOLS 2 (2015), https://www.southerneducation
.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/New-Majority-Update-Bulletin.pdf [https://
perma.cc/3SVE-EZJS]. In some states, substantially more than 50% of students live in
poverty. Id. at 2–3. For example, 71% of students in Mississippi and 68% of students
in New Mexico live in poverty. Id.
397. Insurance itself spreads loss; that is its purpose. Donald C. Langevoort, Capping Damages for Open-Market Securities Fraud, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 639, 649 (1996) (“Loss
spreading, of course, is what insurance is all about . . . .”); Malia Herman, Threat of DataPrivacy Litigation Fuels District Insurance Purchases, EDUC. WEEK (Oct. 19, 2015),
https://www.edweek.org/technology/threat-of-data-privacy-litigation-fuels-district
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Loss-spreading principles and liability insurance, however, do
not address concerns about informational error costs. 398 Such concerns focus on the costs involved with courts in developing the institutional capacity and knowledge needed to decide certain cases. 399
These costs include the increased decisional errors that can happen
when making decisions if “information costs (or any other transaction
costs) are high.”400
In Title IX cases, courts express concerns about informational
costs when they disclaim any basis for or authority to involve themselves in school pedagogy or discipline.401 Yet, such qualms about the
courts’ institutional capacity are largely unfounded in the Title IX
-insurance-purchases/2015/10 [https://perma.cc/G77G-VCDN]; see also Dave Arnold, Insuring Your Good Name, NAT’L EDUC. ASS’N, http://web.archive.org/web/
20200714040800/https://www.nea.org/home/14629.htm [https://perma.cc/4AVZ
-UD5H]; Risk Management Fund, GA. SCH. BDS. ASS’N, https://gsba.com/member
-services/risk-management/about-rms/risk-management-fund/#school [https://
perma.cc/42DT-ST58]; Errors & Omissions/General Liability Fund, N.C. SCH. BDS. ASS’N,
http://www.ncsba.org/risk-management/errors-omissionsgeneral-liability-fund
[https://perma.cc/2KTD-4DNN]. That said, arguably, such insurance could create a
more classic moral hazard. See Baker, supra note 389, at 272. With such insurance,
schools’ operating resources are not used to pay civil claims because they are paid by
insurance policies. See id. It could incentivize schools to ignore student sexual harassment because they will not have to pay for any civil damages when they do. However,
insurance companies can and do ward off those effects by not covering such claims.
See id. at 281 (“[G]eneral controls over an insured’s ability to recover loss reflect the
widespread agreement that insurance has a significant effect on what people do to recover from loss.”).
398. See Scott A. Moss, Students and Workers and Prisoners—Oh, My! A Cautionary
Note About Excessive Institutional Tailoring of First Amendment Doctrine, 54 UCLA L.
REV. 1635, 1658 (2007) (“[When litigation involves] specialized knowledge, such as
[with] schools and prisons, the information costs of adjudication may be especially
high. Litigants must expend more time and expense explaining the case to the court,
and the court must expend more time and effort learning the information necessary to
make a good ruling. [In such cases,] ‘error costs will be high as well, because with the
courts likely having less information when making their rulings, the odds of erroneous
rulings are greater.’”).
399. See id.
400. See id.
401. In Davis, the dissent based its arguments against school Title IX liability for
peer sexual harassment in part on strong concerns such as liability requiring courts to
involve themselves in student discipline determinations, which it said the schools “are
usually in the best position to judge.” Davis v. Monroe Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629,
678 (1999) (Kennedy, J., dissenting); see also Doe v. Bd. of Educ., 605 F. App’x 159, 165
(4th Cir. 2015) (approving of the lower court’s rationale for rejecting the argument for
more oversight of the school’s responses to student sexual harassment because it
would “deprive school administrators of the flexibility to employ tailored responses to
sexual harassment and run counter to the strong national policy in favor of educating
children”).
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context or with respect to the recommendations made here. The
standard proposed here does not require courts to delve deeply into
the substance of school pedagogy or discipline, as would be required,
for example, if it called for them to decide whether a particular pedagogical method was best suited to teach students about sexual harassment.402 Further, no such analysis is needed to evaluate schools’ utter
failures to respond to reports of sexual harassment or their repetition
of known ineffective responses. Even in more complicated cases that
would require courts to determine whether a school’s response was
reasonably designed, that inquiry requires a determination of
whether schools made reasonable efforts to determine the cause of a
problem and made reasonable efforts to address it.403 It does not, for
example, call for courts to evaluate whether the schools correctly determined the cause every time, which would be a more complicated
evaluation that has more potential to lead to error costs.404
All that said, such institutional capacity concerns do not currently
constrain the courts from effectively and bluntly eliminating a remedy
for much of the sexual harassment students currently suffer.405 Even
though other institutions, including the legislative and executive
branches, could arguably craft nuanced remedial solutions that would
address the courts’ underlying concerns about imposing liability on
schools for sexual harassment, the courts nevertheless simply eliminate almost any remedy for such harassment without any apparent
misgivings about institutional capacity.406 If such institutional capacity concerns do not restrain the courts from purging remedies, they
should likewise not then constrain them from requiring them.

402. See supra Part III.A.
403. See supra Part III.A.1.
404. Instead, the inquiry proposed here requires courts to do the kinds of fact-finding that they do in many other sorts of cases. Tort requires similar, if not more challenging, fact-finding in negligence claims. To determine whether a defendant is negligent, courts must determine the actual and proximate causes of harm. See DOBBS ET AL.,
supra note 219, § 206. Under the proximate cause, or “scope of liability,” rules “the defendant [is] subject to liability if [s]he could reasonably foresee the nature of the harm
done, even if the total amount of harm turned out to be quite unforeseeably large.” Id.
Consequently, juries and judges must determine what harm a defendant could foresee
occurring as the result of his or her negligence. See id. The Supreme Court has required
an at least as, if not more, onerous fact-finding in § 1983 cases when it has set courts
to the task of determining whether better training would result in a hypothetical reasonable police officer acting to avoid injury to a person in custody. See City of Canton
v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 391 (1989); supra note 288 and accompanying text.
405. See supra Parts I.A–C, II.B.2.
406. See supra Parts I.A–C, II.B.2.
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Another possible critique of these proposals is that they increase
the administrative burdens on the schools.407 To be sure, they do require more administratively of schools. Such concerns are persuasive
when the administrative burdens outweigh the benefit they seek to
accomplish. 408 Because the administrative tasks proposed here,
though, are to the end of meaningfully preventing and addressing the
serious harm of sexual harassment, they are justified.409
Finally, these recommended changes could risk the overidentification and punishment of students by race. This concern has a strong
foundation in schools’ current disciplinary practices. Schools already
discipline more students of color, particularly by way of suspending
and expelling them, for all manner of school discipline code violations.410 If the public schools face increased potential liability for failing to respond or respond adequately to student sexual harassment,
they may, as Justice Kennedy feared in Davis, simply suspend and

407. Such concerns abound in education policy and reform, including in the civil
rights context. For example, the findings and purposes section of the IDEA states that
“[i]mproving educational results for children with disabilities is an essential element
of our national policy of ensuring equality of opportunity, full participation, independent living, and economic self-sufficiency for individuals with disabilities,” but also
states that it seeks to “[focus] resources on teaching and learning [and reduce] paperwork and requirements that do not assist in improving educational results.” 20 U.S.C.
§ 1400(c)(1), (5)(G).
408. For a discussion of such cost-benefit analyses in other contexts, see generally
M. Todd Henderson, The Nanny Corporation, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 1517, 1552, 1568 (2009),
which argues that “the nanny corporation may be superior to the nanny state at writing efficient rules . . . [such as taxing food to reduce obesity because] the administrative
burden in trying to ascertain the costs and benefits of each food or each ingredient is
likely to be daunting, if not impossible”; Robert G. Bone, Enforcement Costs and Trademark Puzzles, 90 VA. L. REV. 2099, 2101–02 (2004), which argues in the trademark context that “[e]nforcement costs are important to the design of trademark rules, because . . . . case-specific inquiry into the costs and benefits of trademark protection is
likely to be administratively burdensome and error-prone”; and Stephen P. Croley &
William F. Funk, The Federal Advisory Committee Act and Good Government, 14 YALE J.
ON REGUL. 451, 451, 555 (1997), which argues that the Federal Advisory Committee
Act, which “governs agency solicitation of policy advice from outside groups, . . . adds
administrative burden and cost without benefit.”
409. See supra note 408 and accompanying text.
410. E.g., Halley, supra note 382, at 107 (arguing that “the general social disadvantage that black men continue to carry in our culture can make it easier for everyone
in the adjudicative process to put the blame on them”); Bazelon, supra note 382 (arguing that racial implications of the current title IX standards demand reform, noting
“[w]e have long over-sexualized, over-criminalized and disproportionately punished
black men. It should come as no surprise that, in [the Title IX enforcement] setting in
which protections for the accused are greatly diminished, this shameful legacy persists.”).
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expel them at every report of harassment.411 Such blanket responses
could easily disproportionately affect students of color.412 Nothing in
these proposals, however, suggests that the method for addressing
student harassment must, or even should, be punitive disciplinary
measures. Quite to the contrary, students who sexually harass and assault other students often need mental health and other related interventions.413 In those cases, suspending and expelling students would
not meet the standard that calls for schools to reasonably design their
interventions because it would not address the source of the problem.414 While it would temporarily remove such children from school,
such removals are not permanent.415 Without connecting students to
mental health services, therefore, schools can virtually expect the
problems to recur. 416 Far from suspending and expelling those students, therefore, the public schools would do far more to avoid liability by treating it in those ways. While not insignificant, then, all of
these critiques have answers, and as such, they do not obviate the
need for the changes recommended here to better protect students
from sexual harassment in school.
CONCLUSION
The deliberate indifference standard has largely unrealized potential to achieve Title IX’s purpose of protecting students from sexual
harassment in the public schools. By proscribing schools’ responses to
known student sexual harassment that both risk and indirectly cause
411. Davis v. Monroe Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 681 (1999) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“Title IX liability will, in all likelihood, breed a climate of fear that encourages
school administrators to label even the most innocuous of childish conduct sexual harassment [and impose discipline for it].”); Doe v. Bd. of Educ., 605 F. App’x 159, 165 (4th
Cir. 2015) (approving of the district court’s rejection of the student’s deliberate indifference argument in part because “nothing short of expulsion of every student accused
of misconduct involving sexual overtones” would protect schools from liability (quoting Davis, 526 U.S. at 648)).
412. See supra note 410 and accompanying text.
413. See supra note 310 and accompanying text.
414. See supra Parts III.A–C.
415. Even expulsions generally do not last more than twelve months. In California,
a school district cannot expel a student for more than one year. See CAL. EDUC. CODE
§ 48917(a) (1996). See generally CHILD TRENDS & EMT ASSOCS., INC., COMPENDIUM OF
SCHOOL DISCIPLINE LAWS AND REGULATIONS FOR THE 50 STATES, DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA AND
THE U.S. TERRITORIES (2020), https://safesupportivelearning.ed.gov/sites/default/
files/discipline-compendium/School%20Discipline%20Laws%20and%
20Regulations%20Compendium.pdf [https://perma.cc/549E-WRJP] (detailing states’
expulsion lengths and limits).
416. See supra notes 310–11 and accompanying text.
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students further sexual harassment, the standard can require that
schools take affirmative steps to accomplish these ends. Yet in their
evaluations of deliberate indifference, the lower courts jettison any
assessment of either risk or cause. In doing so, they not only drain the
deliberate indifference standard of its complete meaning and defeat
Title IX’s protective purpose, but they also permit schools’ responses
to sexual harassment that put students at risk for and actually cause
their further sexual harassment. The courts therefore subvert Title IX
in both purpose and effect.
To restore Title IX’s purpose and achieve its intended effects, the
deliberate indifference standard needs to explicitly require what it
now only implicitly demands. The deliberate indifference standard
should mandate that schools affirmatively protect students from
known sexual harassment. In addition to recommending this recast
standard, this Article proposes a framework for its evaluation. It also
develops a new legal presumption such that when a school repeats the
use of failed responses to sexual harassment, courts would presume
that the school acted with deliberate indifference. Finally, this Article
advances Title IX regulatory changes to reinforce the protections that
the law seeks to provide. These proposals offer the promise of reinvigorating Title IX’s purpose and preventing and addressing student
sexual harassment in schools.

